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Abstract
Computability logic is a formal theory of computational tasks and resources. Formulas in it represent interactive computational
problems, and “truth” is understood as algorithmic solvability. Interactive computational problems, in turn, are defined as
games between a machine and its environment, with logical operators standing for operations on games. Within the program
of finding axiomatizations for incrementally rich fragments of this semantically introduced logic, the earlier article “From truth
to computability I” proved soundness and completeness for system CL3, whose language has the so-called parallel connectives
(including negation), choice connectives, choice quantifiers, and blind quantifiers. The present paper extends that result to the
significantly more expressive systemCL4with the same collection of logical operators. What makesCL4 expressive is the presence
of two sorts of atoms in its language: elementary atoms, representing elementary computational problems (i.e. predicates, i.e.
problems of zero degree of interactivity), and general atoms, representing arbitrary computational problems. CL4 conservatively
extends CL3, with the latter being nothing but the general-atom-free fragment of the former. Removing the blind (classical) group
of quantifiers from the language of CL4 is shown to yield a decidable logic despite the fact that the latter is still first-order.
c© 2007 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
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1. Introduction
Being a continuation of [6], this article fully relies on the terminology, notation, conventions and technical results
of its predecessor, with which the reader is assumed to be familiar.
The atoms of our old friend CL3 represent predicates rather than computational problems in general. So, CL3 only
allows us to talk about elementary problems and their particular (¬,∧,∨,→,u,unionsq,u,unionsq,∀,∃)-combinations. This is
a rather serious limitation of expressive power. By far not every natural problem of potential interest can be expressed
as a combination of the above sort, including all problems with infinitely or arbitrarily long legal runs. And even
though finite strict games such as chess always can be, in principle, represented as u,unionsq-combinations of elementary
games (terminal positions), the sizes of such representations would often be beyond reasonable. To get a feel for what
is missing in CL3, imagine a situation where we just want to be able to directly say “Chess”, “Go” etc. (i.e. have
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these as atoms), and then ask questions such as whether and how the problem (of winning) Go unionsq (Chess ∧ Checkers)
can be reduced to (Go unionsq Chess) ∧ (Go unionsq Checkers). CL3 does not give us this ability because its formalism does
not allow atoms for non-elementary problems. True, CL3 still might help us find a positive answer to at least the
‘whether’ part of the above particular question. Specifically, in view of the soundness of CL3, it would suffice to
show that, for all formulas E, F,G, CL3 proves (E unionsq F) ∧ (E unionsq G) → E unionsq (F ∧ G). This, however, would require
some creative reasoning in the metatheory of CL3 rather than CL3 itself. And even if we managed to succeed in this
metareasoning, we still would not be able to automatically conclude that every problem of the form A unionsq (B ∧ C)
is algorithmically reducible to (A unionsq B) ∧ (A unionsq C). Rather, we would only know that this is so as long as A,B,C
are (¬,∧,∨,→,u,unionsq,u,unionsq,∀,∃)-combinations of elementary problems. While the class of problems of this sort
is certainly interesting and non-trivial, it – as already pointed out – is only a modest fraction of the collection of all
entities that we call interactive computational problems.
By simply redefining the semantics of the language of CL3 and no longer requiring that its atoms be interpreted
as elementary problems, we would certainly gain a lot. But perhaps just as much would be lost: the class of valid
formulas would shrink, victimizing many important and innocent principles. The point is that elementary problems
are meaningful and interesting in their own right, and losing the ability to differentiate them from problems in general
would be too much of a sacrifice. What else would be automatically gone is the nice fact that classical logic is a
fragment of the new logic.
Computability logic has a better solution. It simply allows two sorts of atoms in its language, one for elementary
problems and the other for all problems. This way, not only do we have the ability to characterize valid principles for
problems of either sort within the same formal system, but we can as well capture principles that intermix elementary
problems with ones that are not necessarily elementary. Such an approach also has technical advantages. As we are
going to see, logic CL4, whose language extends that of CL3 by adding to it the second sort of atoms, has a rather
simple axiomatization, while it remains unclear whether there is a reasonable deductive system for the fragment of
computability logic whose language only has the second sort of atoms.1
This article is primarily devoted to a soundness and completeness proof for the above-mentioned system CL4.
Its secondary result is a proof of the decidability of the ∀,∃-free (yet first-order) fragment of CL4. These results,
with a forward reference to the present paper, have been announced in [5,8]. Soundness and completeness for the
propositional fragment CL2 of CL4 was proven in [4]. The present article strengthens the results of its predecessor
in the same sense as [4] strengthens [3], the difference being that here we deal with the significantly more expressive
first-order level, as opposed to the propositional level of [3,4].
Mathematical curiosity aside, the main practical import of our results is first of all related to the potential of
basing applied theories or knowledge base systems on CL4, the latter being a reasonable, computationally meaningful
alternative to classical logic. The non-logical axioms – or knowledge base – of a CL4-based applied system/theory
would be any collection of (formulas representing) problems whose algorithmic solutions are known. Then our
soundness result for CL4, which comes in a strong form called uniform-constructive soundness, guarantees that
every theorem T of the theory also has an algorithmic solution and that, furthermore, such a solution, itself, can be
effectively constructed from a proof of T . This makes CL4 a systematic problem-solving tool: finding a solution
for a given problem reduces to finding a proof of that problem in a CL4-based theory, with completeness meaning
that, in its language, CL4 is as perfect/strong as a formal tool could possibly be. Section 6 of [6] discussed some of
the advantages and appeal of basing applied systems on CL3.2 That discussion, however, dealt with systems where
the new logical operators (those of computability logic) were applied to the old non-logical atoms (those of classical
logic): predicates.CL4 offers a more far-reaching way for enriching traditional applied systems, allowing us to include
in their vocabularies atoms that represent higher-level entities: computational problems of arbitrary complexities and
degrees of interactivity, including infinite dialogues between a problem-solving agent and its environment. This is a
substantially new level of expressiveness that the needs of advanced interactive applied systems would be inherently
calling for.
1 The very recently conceived syntactic approach called cirquent calculus [7] does provide a nice axiomatization for a certain fragment of
computability logic in a language that only has the second sort of atoms. The language of that fragment is only a modest fraction of that of CL4
though and, while the cirquent calculus approach seems promising, at present CL4 remains by far the most expressive system for computability
logic known to be sound and complete.
2 More elaborated discussions of applied systems based on computability logic can be found in Section 8 of [5] or Section 10 of [8]. See also
Sections 26–28 of [2].
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2. Logic CL4
Let us rename what in [6] was called “predicate letters” into “elementary letters”. The language of CL4 augments
that of CL3 with an additional sort of syntactic objects called general letters, again each such object coming with
a fixed arity. “Letter” is a common name for elementary and general letters. It is assumed that, for every n ≥ 0,
there are infinitely many n-ary letters of either sort. All general letters are considered non-logical. An atom of the
language of CL4 is L(t1, . . . , tn), where L is an n-ary letter and each ti is a term, i.e. (as before) an element of the
set of variables {v0, v1, . . .} or constants {0, 1, . . .}. This atom is said to be n-ary because L is so. In a similar way,
we extend the usage of the terms “elementary”, “general”, “non-logical” etc. from letters to atoms. CL4-formulas, or
henceforth often simply formulas, are built from atoms in the same way as CL3-formulas, using the “propositional”
connectives ¬,∧,∨,→,u,unionsq and quantifiers ∀,∃,u,unionsq. However, following the practice of [6], throughout the rest
of this article – unless otherwise suggested by the context – the term “formula” will be used in a slightly stricter sense.
Specifically, it will be assumed that no formula contains both a free and a bound occurrence of the same variable.
Here the definition of a free occurrence of a variable x is as before: this means that the occurrence is not in the scope
of ∀x,∃x,ux or unionsqx ; and, of course, “bound” means “not free”. When a given occurrence of a variable x is in the
scope of Qx for more than one quantifier Q, the occurrence is considered bound by the quantifier “nearest” to it. For
instance, the third occurrence of x in ∀x(R unionsqunionsqx P(x)) is bound byunionsq rather than ∀. An occurrence bound by ∀ or ∃
is said to be blindly bound.
An interpretation for the language of CL4 is a function that sends each n-ary general (resp. elementary non-
logical) letter L to a problem (resp. elementary problem) with an attached tuple (x1, . . . , xn) of n pairwise distinct
variables. We denote such a problem by L∗(x1, . . . , xn), call (x1, . . . , xn) the canonical tuple of L∗, and say that “∗
interprets L as L∗(x1, . . . , xn)”. There is no redundancy in saying so, for this phrase conveys non-trivial information
about the context-setting canonical tuple — a context in which, according to our earlier conventions (Section 4 of [6]),
we can unambiguously write L∗(t1, . . . , tn) to mean L∗[x1/t1, . . . , xn/tn]. Sometimes, however, there is no need for
being specific about the canonical tuple. In such cases we may simply write “L∗”, which should be strictly understood
as an abbreviation of L∗(x1, . . . , xn) where (x1, . . . , xn) is the canonical tuple of L∗.
Note that, just as in the case of CL3, we do not insist that interpretations respect the arities of letters. Specifically,
we do not require that L∗ depend on only (or all) the variables from its canonical tuple, or even be finitary. To avoid
the possibility of unpleasant collisions of variables under such a liberal approach, in [6] interpretations were restricted
to “admissible” ones. Some additional caution is necessary in the present case, as we need to guarantee that ∀x and ∃x
are only applied to games for which they are defined, i.e. x-unistructural games. Therefore the concept of admissibility
now sharpens as follows:
Definition 2.1. For a formula F and interpretation ∗, we say that ∗ is F-admissible, or admissible for F , iff, for every
n-ary letter L of F , the following two conditions are satisfied:
(i) L∗ does not depend on any variables that are not in its canonical tuple but occur in F .
(ii) Suppose F contains an occurrence of L(t1, . . . , tn), the occurrence of ti (1 ≤ i ≤ n) within which is blindly
bound in F . Then L∗ is unistructural in the i th variable of its canonical tuple.
Notice that condition (ii) of the above definition is automatically satisfied when L is elementary, because an
elementary problem is always unistructural. That is why this condition was absent in [6]. In most typical cases we
will be interested in interpretations ∗ that interpret each letter L as a finitary unistructural game L∗(x1, . . . , xn) which
does not depend on any variables other than x1, . . . , xn , so that both conditions (i) and (ii) of Definition 2.1 will be
automatically satisfied. With this remark in mind, henceforth we may sometimes omit “F-admissible” and simply
say “interpretation”; every time an expression F∗ is used in a context, it should be understood that the range of ∗ is
restricted to F-admissible interpretations.
Every interpretation ∗ extends from letters to formulas in the obvious way: where L is an n-ary letter interpreted
as L∗(x1, . . . , xn) and t1, . . . , tn are any terms,
(
L(t1, . . . , tn)
)∗ = L∗(t1, . . . , tn); >∗ = >; (¬G)∗ = ¬(G∗);
(G1 u · · · u Gn)∗ = G∗1 u · · · u G∗n ; (∀xG)∗ = ∀x(G∗); etc. We say that a formula F is valid iff, for every
F-admissible interpretation ∗, the problem F∗ is computable.
Since the blind operations are only partial functions, the above inductive definition of F∗ does not quite
automatically guarantee that F∗ is always defined, so the following fact needs to be verified for safety, which will
be formally done in Appendix A.
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Fact 2.2. For any formula F and F-admissible interpretation ∗, the game F∗ is defined.
We extend to the language of CL4 the notational conventions from [6] (Section 5) regarding the meaning of
E[x1/t1, . . . , xn/tn] and representing formulas in the form E(x1, . . . , xn), which sets a context allowing us to write
E(t1, . . . , tn) instead of E[x1/t1, . . . , xn/tn].
The terms “negative occurrence” and “positive occurrence” have the same meaning as before. Similarly, a surface
occurrence of a subexpression in a formula is an occurrence that is not in the scope of u,unionsq,u,unionsq. When a formula
contains neither any of these four operators nor general letters, it is said to be elementary. The elementarization of
a formula E is the result of replacing in E every surface occurrence of the form G1 u · · · u Gn oruxG by >, every
surface occurrence of the form G1 unionsq · · · unionsq Gn orunionsqxG by ⊥, every positive surface occurrence of each general atom
by ⊥, and every negative surface occurrence of each general atom by >. A formula is stable iff its elementarization
is a valid formula of classical logic.3 Otherwise it is instable.
The rules of inference of CL4 are the three rules A, B1 and B2 of CL3 – only, now applied to any CL4-formulas
rather than just CL3-formulas – plus one single additional rule C. Here are all four rules:
A EH 7→ E , where E is stable and EH is a set of formulas satisfying the following conditions:
(i) Whenever E has a positive (resp. negative) surface occurrence of a subformula G1 u · · · u Gn (resp.
G1 unionsq . . . unionsq Gn), for each i ∈ {1, . . . , n}, EH contains the result of replacing that occurrence in E by Gi .
(ii) Whenever E has a positive (resp. negative) surface occurrence of a subformulauxG(x) (resp.unionsqxG(x)),
EH contains the result of replacing that occurrence in E by G(y) for some variable y not occurring in E .
B1 H 7→ E , where H is the result of replacing in E a negative (resp. positive) surface occurrence of a subformula
G1 u · · · u Gn (resp. G1 unionsq · · · unionsq Gn) by Gi for some i ∈ {1, . . . , n}.
B2 H 7→ E , where H is the result of replacing in E a negative (resp. positive) surface occurrence of a subformulauxG(x) (resp.unionsqxG(x)) by G(t) for some term t such that t is not bound in H .
C H 7→ E , where H is the result of replacing in E two – one positive and one negative – surface occurrences
of some n-ary general letter by an n-ary non-logical elementary letter that does not occur in E .
Let us agree that, throughout this paper (with one little exception in Section 5), the uppercase P, Q, R, S always
stand for general letters and the lowercase p, q, r, s for non-logical elementary letters. In any given context, all these
letters will be assumed to be pairwise distinct, and the arity of each letter will be the length of the tuple of terms
attached to it. When a letter L is 0-ary, we write L rather than L(). x, y, z will always stand for variables (again,
usually assumed to be pairwise distinct), t for terms, and c for constants.
Looking at a few examples should help us get a syntactic feel for our most unusual deductive system. The following
is a CL4-proof ofuxunionsqy(P(x) → P(y)):
1. p(z) → p(z) (from {} by Rule A)
2. P(z) → P(z) (from 1 by Rule C)
3. unionsqy(P(z) → P(y)) (from 2 by Rule B2)
4. uxunionsqy(P(x) → P(y)) (from {3} by Rule A).
On the other hand, CL4 6` unionsqyux(P(x) → P(y)). Indeed, obviously this instable formula cannot be the
conclusion of any rule but B2. If it is derived by this rule, the premise should be ux(P(x) → P(t)) for some
term t different from x . ux(P(x) → P(t)), in turn, could only be derived by Rule A where, for some variable
y different from t , P(y) → P(t) is a (the) premise. The latter is an instable formula and does not contain choice
operators, so the only rule by which it can be derived is C, where the premise is p(y) → p(t) for some elementary
letter p. Now we deal with a classically non-valid and hence instable elementary formula, and it cannot be derived by
any of the four rules of CL4.
Note that, in contrast, the “blind version” ∃y∀x(P(x) → P(y)) ofunionsqyux(P(x) → P(y)) is provable:
1. ∃y∀x(p(x) → p(y)) (from {} by Rule A)
2. ∃y∀x(P(x) → P(y)) (from 1 by Rule C).
3 Stability is meant to be a syntactic concept, yet its definition seemingly relies on the semantical notion of classical validity. No problem: in
view of Go¨del’s completeness theorem, “valid formula of classical logic” can be understood as a lazy way to say “provable formula of classical
predicate calculus”.
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‘There is y such that, for all x, P(x) → P(y)’ is true yet not in a constructive sense, thus belonging to the kinds
of principles that have been fueling those endless and fruitless fights between the classically and constructivistically
minded. Computability logic is offering a peaceful settlement, telling the arguing parties: “There is no need to fight
at all. It appears that you simply have two different concepts of there is/for all. So, why not also use two different
names: ∃/∀ andunionsq/u. Yes, ∃y∀x(P(x) → P(y)) is indeed right; and yes,unionsqyux(P(x) → P(y)) is indeed wrong”.
Clauses 1 and 2 of Exercise 2.3 illustrate a similar solution for excluded middle— the most typically attacked principle
of classical logic.
The above-said remains true with p instead of P , for what was relevant there was the difference between
the constructive and non-constructive versions of logical operators rather than how atoms were understood. Then
how about the difference between the elementary and non-elementary versions of atoms? This distinction allows
computability logic to again act in its noble role of a reconciliator/integrator, but this time between classical and linear
logics, telling them: “It appears that you have two different concepts of the objects that logic is meant to study. So,
why not also use two different sorts of atoms to represent such objects: elementary atoms p, q, . . . , and general atoms
P, Q, . . . . Yes, p → p∧ p is indeed right; and yes, P → P∧P (Exercise 2.3(4)) is indeed wrong”. However, the term
“linear logic” in this context should be understood in a very generous sense, referring not to the particular deductive
system LL proposed by Girard but rather to the general philosophy and intuitions traditionally associated with LL and
some other, earlier- but less-known, substructural logics. For, as pointed out in [2,5–8], computability logic considers
LL – with its multiplicatives seen as parallel operators and additives as choice operators – incomplete, only partially
agreeing with LL regarding what principles should be deemed wrong. An example of such a principle is P ∧ P → P
(Exercise 2.3(3)), accepted byCL4 but rejected by LL. This formula becomes derivable if the weakening rule is added
to LL, i.e. in the substructural logic in the past known under the name BCK, and after the conception of LL more
frequently referred to as the additive–multiplicative fragment of affine logic. But just adding the weakening rule to LL
is not sufficient to save the case. There are CL4-provable formulas derivable in neither LL nor BCK.4 Clause 16 of
Exercise 2.3 provides an example. Another example is Blass’s [1] principle (P ∧Q)∨ (R∧ S) → (P ∨ R)∧ (Q∨ S).
Exercise 2.3. In clauses 12 and 13 below, “CL4 ` E ⇔ F” stands for “CL4 ` E → F and CL4 ` F → E”. Verify
that:
1. CL4 ` P ∨ ¬P .
2. CL4 6` P unionsq ¬P . Compare with 1.
3. CL4 ` P ∧ P → P .
4. CL4 6` P → P ∧ P . Compare with 3,5.
5. CL4 ` P → P u P .
6. CL4 ` (P unionsq Q) ∧ (P unionsq R) → P unionsq (Q ∧ R). Remember the Go/Chess/Checkers example from Section 1.
7. CL4 6` P unionsq (Q ∧ R) → (P unionsq Q) ∧ (P unionsq R). Compare with 6,8.
8. CL4 ` p unionsq (Q ∧ R) → ( p unionsq Q) ∧ ( p unionsq R).
9. CL4 6` p u (Q ∧ R) → ( p u Q) ∧ ( p u R). Compare with 8.
10. CL4 ` ∀x P(x) → ux P(x).
11. CL4 6` ux P(x) → ∀x P(x). Compare with 10.
12. CL4 ` ∃x P(x) u ∃xQ(x) ⇔ ∃x(P(x) u Q(x)). Similarly for unionsq instead of u, and/or ∀ instead of ∃.
13. CL4 ` ux∃yP(x, y) ⇔ ∃yux P(x, y). Similarly forunionsq instead ofu, and/or ∀ instead of ∃.
14. CL4 ` ∀ x(P(x) ∧ Q(x)) → ∀x P(x) ∧ ∀xQ(x).
15. CL4 6` ux(P(x) ∧ Q(x)) → ux P(x) ∧uxQ(x). Compare with 14.
16. CL4 ` ux((P(x) ∧uxQ(x)) u (ux P(x) ∧ Q(x))) → ux P(x) ∧uxQ(x).
Taking into account that classical validity and hence stability is recursively enumerable, the following fact is
obvious:
Fact 2.4. (The set of theorems of ) CL4 is recursively enumerable.
4 WhileBCK is incomplete and hence so is affine logic as a conservative extension of it, affine logic in its full additive–multiplicative–exponential
language has been proven ([8]) to be sound with respect to the semantics of computability logic.
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In Section 6 we will also prove that
Theorem 2.5. The ∀,∃-free fragment of (the set of theorems of) CL4 is decidable.
The above theorem – just as the similar result forCL3 known from [6] – establishes a nice fact, contrasting with the
situation in classical logic: note that the ∀,∃-free fragment ofCL4 is still first-order as it contains the quantifiersu,unionsq.
This fragment is also natural as it gets rid of the only operators of the language that produce games with imperfect
information.
Next, based on the straightforward observation that elementary formulas are derivable in CL4 (in particular, from
the empty set of premises by Rule A) exactly when they are classically valid and hence derivable in classical predicate
calculus, we have:
Fact 2.6. CL4 is a conservative extension of classical predicate logic: the latter is nothing but the elementary
fragment of the former.
The following main Theorem 2.7, even though by an order of magnitude more informative than Go¨del’s
completeness theorem for classical logic which it implies (by Fact 2.6) as a special case, is perhaps only one of
the first steps on the way of in-depth study of computability logic. Seeing what happens if we add the recurrence
group of operators (see Subsection 4.6 of [8]) to the language of CL4 remains a challenging but worthy task for the
future to pursue.
Theorem 2.7. CL4 ` F iff F is valid (any formula F). Furthermore:
Uniform-constructive soundness: There is an effective procedure that takes a CL4-proof of an arbitrary formula
F and constructs an HPM that wins F∗ for every interpretation ∗.
Strong completeness: If F is not provable in CL4, then F∗ is not computable for some interpretation ∗ that
interprets elementary letters as finitary predicates of arithmetical complexity ∆2, and interprets general letters as
u,unionsq-combinations of finitary predicates of arithmetical complexity ∆2.
It was shown in [6] that the soundness/completeness result for CL3 implied a positive verification of Conjectures
24.4, 25.4, 26.2 of [2] restricted to the language of that logic. For similar reasons, our Theorem 2.7 signifies a positive
verification of those three conjectures restricted to the significantly more expressive language of CL4. The rest of this
paper – with the exception of the last short section – is devoted to a proof of Theorem 2.7, which is nothing but a
combination of Lemmas 4.1 (soundness) and 5.1 (completeness).
3. Preliminaries
3.1. From formulas to hyperformulas
In the bottom-up (from conclusion to premises) view, Rule C introduces two occurrences of some new non-logical
elementary letter. For technical convenience, we want to differentiate elementary letters introduced this way from all
other elementary letters, and also to somehow keep track of the exact origin of each such elementary letter q — that is,
remember what general letter P was replaced by q when RuleCwas applied. For this purpose, we extend the language
of CL4 by adding to it a new sort of non-logical letters (correspondingly extending the scope of the common term
“letter”) called hybrid. In particular, each n-ary hybrid letter is a pair consisting of an n-ary general letter P , called
its general component, and an n-ary non-logical elementary letter q, called its elementary component. We denote
such a pair by Pq . As we are going to see later, the presence of Pq in a (modified CL4-) proof will be an indication
of the fact that, in the bottom-up view of proofs, q has been introduced by Rule C and that when this happened, the
general letter that q replaced was P .
In this new context, an atom – in particular, n-ary atom – is the expression L(t1, . . . , tn), where L is an n-ary
(elementary, general or hybrid) letter and the ti are any terms. We will often abbreviate such a tuple t1, . . . , tn as Et .
The atom L(Et) is said to be L-based, and any two L-based atoms are said to be same-base. An L-based atom is said to
be elementary, general, hybrid, logical or non-logical iff the letter L is so. What we call hyperformulas are defined in
the same way as formulas, with the only difference that now atomic expressions can be of any of the three (elementary,
general or hybrid) sorts. “Subhyperformula” in the context of hyperformulas will mean the same as “subformula” in
the context of formulas. Our conventions regarding the notation E[x1/t1, . . . , xn/tn], or representing formulas in the
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form E(x1, . . . , xn) and then writing E(t1, . . . , tn) for E[x1/t1, . . . , xn/tn], extend from formulas to hyperformulas
in the obvious way. So do the concepts such as a surface (or positive, or negative) occurrence of a subexpression, a
free (or bound, or blindly bound) occurrence of a variable, etc. The concept of a free occurrence naturally extends to
all terms by stipulating that an occurrence of a constant in a hyperformula is always free. By a free variable of a given
hyperformula E we mean a variable that has at least one free occurrence in E . If there are no such variables, then E
is said to be closed. As with formulas, it will be typically assumed that no variable occurs both free and bound in any
given hyperformula, unless the context forbids making such an assumption.
A hyperformula E is said to be balanced iff, for every hybrid letter Pq occurring in E , the following conditions
are satisfied:
1. E has exactly two occurrences of Pq , where one occurrence is positive and the other occurrence is negative, and
both occurrences are surface occurrences;
2. The elementary letter q does not occur in E , nor is it the elementary component of any hybrid letter occurring in
E other than Pq .
An elementary hyperformula is one not containing u, unionsq, u and unionsq, as well as general and hybrid atoms. Thus,
elementary hyperformula and elementary formula mean the same. The elementarization
‖E‖
of a hyperformula E is the result of replacing, in E , each surface occurrence of the form G1 u · · · uGn oruxG by>,
each surface occurrence of the form G1 unionsq · · · unionsq Gn orunionsqxG by ⊥, every positive (resp. negative) surface occurrence
of each general atom by ⊥ (resp. >), and every surface occurrence of each hybrid letter by the elementary component
of that letter. As in the case of formulas, we say that a hyperformula E is stable iff ‖E‖ is valid in the classical sense;
otherwise it is instable.
In our soundness proof for CL4 we will employ a “version” of CL4 called CL4◦. Unlike CL4 whose language
consists only of formulas, the language of CL4◦ allows any balanced hyperformulas. The rules of CL4◦ are Rules A,
B1 and B2 of CL4 – only now applied to any balanced hyperformulas rather than just formulas – plus the following
rule C◦ instead of C:
C◦ H 7→ E , where E is the result of replacing in H both occurrences of some hybrid letter Pq by its general
component P .
Lemma 3.1. For any formula F, if CL4 ` F, then CL4◦ ` F. Furthermore, there is an effective procedure that
converts any CL4-proof of any formula F into a CL4◦-proof of F.
Idea. Every application of Rule C naturally turns into an application of Rule C◦.
Proof. Consider any CL4-proof tree for F , i.e. a tree every node of which is labeled with a formula that follows by
one of the rules of CL4 from (the labels of) its children, with F being the label of the root. By abuse of terminology,
here we identify the nodes of this tree with their labels, even though, of course, it may be the case that different nodes
have the same label. For each node E of the tree that is derived from its child H by Rule C – in particular, where
H is the result of replacing in E a positive and a negative surface occurrences of an n-ary general letter P by an
n-ary non-logical elementary letter q – do the following: replace q by the hybrid letter Pq in H as well as in all of its
descendants in the tree. It is not hard to see that this way we will get a CL4◦-proof of F . 
Let E be a balanced hyperformula, and Pq an n-ary hybrid letter of E with Pq(t1, . . . , tn) and Pq(t ′1, . . . , t ′n) being
the two Pq -based atoms occurring in E . We say that Pq is an unreasonable hybrid letter of E iff, for some i with
1 ≤ i ≤ n, the occurrence of ti within Pq(t1, . . . , tn) and the occurrence of t ′i within Pq(t ′1, . . . , t ′n) are both free in
E , and ti and t ′i are (graphically) different terms. We say that a hyperformula is reasonable iff it is balanced and does
not have any unreasonable hybrid letters. And we say that a CL4◦-proof is reasonable iff all of its hyperformulas are
reasonable.
Intuitively, as will be seen shortly, the presence of unreasonable hyperformulas in a CL4◦-proof signifies that some
really “unreasonable” steps have been made in the proof. Specifically, in the bottom-up view, the applications of Rule
C◦ that introduced unreasonable hybrid letters were unnecessary, as the premise of such an application is never any
“more provable” (i.e. never has a shorter or simpler proof) than the conclusion.
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Lemma 3.2. Assume E is a balanced hyperformula and Pq an unreasonable hybrid letter of E. Let F be the result of
replacing in E both of the occurrences of letter Pq by P. Then, if E is stable, so is F.
Idea. If Pq is an unreasonable hybrid letter of E , due to the presence of two different free terms in the two q-based
atoms of ‖E‖ such as, say, q(1, Ex) and q(2, Ey), these atoms can be treated as if they simply were atoms based on two
different letters, such as q1(Ex) and q2(Ey). Then q1(Ex) and q2(Ey) are fully isolated – not only from everything else but
also from each other – in the sense that each of the letters q1, q2 occurs only once in the formula. It is known that in
a classically valid formula such isolated atoms can be replaced by whatever formulas without affecting validity. So, if
‖E‖ is valid, it will remain so after replacing in it q1(Ex) by ⊥ and q2(Ey) by > (or vice versa, depending on which one
is positive and which one is negative). The result of such a replacement is exactly what ‖F‖ is.
Proof. Assume the conditions of the lemma. For simplicity, we may also assume that E is closed and hence so is
F . Indeed, otherwise, for every variable x , we can replace all free occurrences of x in these hyperformulas by some
constant not occurring in them, with different variables replaced by different constants. Obviously this conversion
would have no effect on being balanced, reasonable or stable.
Suppose F is instable, i.e., for some classical model M ,
‖F‖ is false in M. (1)
Our goal is to show that then E is instable, too. Let n be the arity of Pq , and assume that the two – positive and negative
– occurrences of Pq in E are within atoms Pq(t1, . . . , tn) and Pq(t ′1, . . . , t ′n), respectively. The unreasonableness of
Pq means that, for some i with 1 ≤ i ≤ n, neither the occurrence of ti within Pq(t1, . . . , tn) nor the occurrence of
t ′i within Pq(t ′1, . . . , t ′n) is bound in E , and ti and t ′i are different terms. Let us take a note that these two terms are
constants because, as we agreed, E has no free occurrences of variables.
Based on known facts from classical logic, we may assume that the universe of discourse of the above model M is
just the (countably infinite) set of our constants, and that each constant c is interpreted as c itself. Also, unlike ‖E‖, ‖F‖
does not contain q , and therefore (1) will continue to hold under arbitrary assumptions regarding how q is interpreted
in M . So, an assumption we are making is that, for any constants c1, . . . , cn , q(c1, . . . , ci−1, ti , ci+1, . . . , cn) is false
in M and q(c1, . . . , ci−1, t ′i , ci+1, . . . , cn) is true. Thus, in M , q(t1, . . . , tn) is equivalent (in the standard classical
sense) to ⊥ and q(t ′1, . . . , t ′n) equivalent to >. Observe that ‖F‖ is nothing but the result of replacing, in ‖E‖, the
occurrence of q(t1, . . . , tn) by ⊥ and the occurrence of q(t ′1, . . . , t ′n) by >. Replacing subformulas by equivalent ones
does not change the truth status of a formula. So ‖E‖ has the same truth value in M as ‖F‖ does, i.e., by (1), is false.
This means that E is instable. 
Lemma 3.3. For any reasonable hyperformula F, if CL4◦ ` F, then F has a reasonable CL4◦-proof. Furthermore,
there is an effective procedure that converts any CL4◦-proof of any reasonable hyperformula F into a reasonable
CL4◦-proof of F.
Idea. Given a CL4◦-proof of a reasonable hyperformula, mechanically disregard in it all of the “unreasonable”
applications of Rule C◦, i.e. the applications that (in the bottom-up view) introduced unreasonable letters.
Proof. In the present context we prefer to see proofs as sequences rather than trees of hyperformulas. For any balanced
hyperformula E , let E˜ mean the result of replacing in E every (occurrence of) every unreasonable hybrid letter by the
general component of that letter.
Consider a CL4◦-proof P of a reasonable hyperformula F . We need to show how to (effectively) convert P into a
reasonable CL4◦-proof of F . Nothing is easier than to do such a conversion: just replace in P every hyperformula E
by E˜ . We claim that the resulting sequence P˜ will be a reasonable CL4◦-proof of F .
Such a claim can be verified by showing that every hyperformula E˜ of P˜ follows by one of the rules of CL4◦ from
a (possibly empty) set of earlier hyperformulas of P˜ . Indeed, assume E is derived in P from {H1, . . . , Hn} by Rule
A. This means that E is stable. Applying Lemma 3.2 as many times as the number of unreasonable hybrid letters in
E , we find that E˜ is also stable. Then, obviously, E˜ follows from {H˜1, . . . , H˜n} by Rule A. In the case where E was
derived in P from a premise H by Rule B1 or B2, evidently we again have that E˜ follows from H˜ by the same rule.
Suppose now E is derived in P from H by Rule C◦ — in particular, H is the result of replacing in E two (positive
and negative) surface occurrences of some general letter P by a hybrid letter Pq . If Pq is not an unreasonable hybrid
letter of H , it is obvious that E˜ follows from H˜ by Rule C◦. Suppose now Pq is an unreasonable hybrid letter of H .
28 G. Japaridze / Theoretical Computer Science 379 (2007) 20–52
Notice that then E˜ = H˜ ; since H occurs in P earlier than E does, we may assume (by the induction hypothesis) that
H˜ follows from some earlier hyperformulas of P˜ by one of the rules. Hence, so does E˜ . 
3.2. Interpretations of hyperformulas
By the general dehybridization of a hyperformula F we mean the formula that is the result of replacing in F every
hybrid letter by the general component of that letter. Where F is a hyperformula and G its general dehybridization,
we say that an interpretation ∗ is F-admissible iff it is G-admissible, and we define the game F∗ to be G∗. By the
earlier definition, remembering that “problem”=“static game”, every interpretation ∗ sends letters to static games, and
it is known from [2] (Theorem 14.1) that all of our game operations preserve the static property of games. So, the
game F∗ (any hyperformula F , any F-admissible interpretation ∗) is always static. We will often implicitly rely on
this fact in the present paper.
We say that two games A and B are equistructural iff LrAe = LrBe for every valuation e.
Lemma 3.4. Assume F is a reasonable hyperformula containing an n-ary hybrid letter Pq , ∗ is an F-admissible
interpretation that interprets P as P∗(x1, . . . , xn), and Pq(t1, . . . , tn) and Pq(t ′1, . . . , t ′n) are the two Pq -based atoms
occurring in F. Then the games P∗(t1, . . . , tn) and P∗(t ′1, . . . , t ′n) are equistructural.
Idea. Due to reasonableness, P∗(t1, . . . , tn) and P∗(t ′1, . . . , t ′n) only differ from each other in terms that are bound
in at least one of these two atoms and, specifically, blindly bound, because, by the first condition of the definition of
“balanced”, we are dealing with a surface occurrence, so the only way to be bound here is blindly. Condition (ii) of
admissibility then guarantees that the structures of the above two games (their Lr components) do not depend on the
values of such terms.
Proof. Assume the conditions of the lemma. Without loss of generality and for convenience of representation, let us
also assume that, for some i (fix it) with 0 ≤ i ≤ n, we have t1 6= t ′1, . . . , ti 6= t ′i and ti+1 = t ′i+1, . . . , tn = t ′n . So,
we can rewrite the two Pq -based atoms of F as Pq(t1, . . . , ti , ti+1, . . . , tn) and Pq(t ′1, . . . , t ′i , ti+1, . . . , tn). As noted
in the preceding paragraph, the reasonableness of F implies that, for each j with 1 ≤ j ≤ i , either the occurrence of
t j within Pq(t1, . . . , ti , ti+1, . . . , tn) or the occurrence of t ′j within Pq(t ′1, . . . , t ′i , ti+1, . . . , tn) is blindly bound in F
and hence in its general dehybridization. In either case, by clause (ii) of Definition 2.1, P∗(x1, . . . , xi , xi+1, . . . , xn)
is unistructural in x j . Thus,
P∗(x1, . . . , xi , xi+1, . . . , xn) is unistructural in each of the variables x1, . . . , xi . (2)
Pick any valuation e. Looking back at Definition 4.1 of [6], we find that LrP
∗(t1,...,ti ,ti+1,...,tn)
e =
LrP
∗(x1,...,xi ,xi+1,...,xn)
g and Lr
P∗(t ′1,...,t ′i ,ti+1,...,tn)
e = LrP
∗(x1,...,xi ,xi+1,...,xn)
g′ , where g and g
′ are certain valuations that
agree with e on all variables that are not among x1, . . . , xn , and agree with each other on xi+1, . . . , xn . Thus, the only
variables on which g and g′ disagree can be x1, . . . , xi . But, by (2), LrP
∗(x1,...,xn)
g does not depend on the value of g
at x1, . . . , xi . Hence Lr
P∗(x1,...,xn)
g = LrP
∗(x1,...,xn)
g′ , and thus Lr
P∗(t1,...,tn)
e = LrP
∗(t ′1,...,t ′n)
e . Since e was arbitrary, we
conclude that P∗(t1, . . . , tn) and P∗(t ′1, . . . , t ′n) are equistructural. 
The concept of a perfect interpretation introduced in [6] naturally extends to the language of CL4: an interpretation
∗ is perfect iff, for every (elementary or general) letter L , L∗ is a finitary game that does not depend on any variables
other than those from its canonical tuple. Next, for an interpretation ∗ and valuation e, the perfect interpretation
induced by (∗, e) is the interpretation Ě that interprets every n-ary (elementary or general) letter L as LĚ(x1, . . . , xn),
where x1, . . . , xn is the canonical tuple of L∗ and LĚ(x1, . . . , xn) is the game such that, for every tuple c1, . . . , cn of
constants, LĚ(c1, . . . , cn) = e[L∗(c1, . . . , cn)]. Intuitively, LĚ is the “strictly n-ary version” of L∗, where the values
of all variables that are not in the canonical tuple are fixed to the constants assigned to those variables by e, so that
LĚ, unlike L∗, does not depend on any variables other than those from its canonical tuple, and Ě really is a perfect
interpretation.
Many of the other concepts and notational conventions of [6] extend to our present context in an even more
straightforward way and there is no need to officially redefine them. These include the notation f F meaning the
result of replacing in (hyper)formula F every free occurrence of every variable by the constant which valuation f
assigns to that variable.
G. Japaridze / Theoretical Computer Science 379 (2007) 20–52 29
The following three Lemmas 3.5–3.7 can be proven in the same way as Lemmas 7.2, 7.3 and 7.7 of [6]: the fact
that those dealt with CL3-formulas rather than hyperformulas is hardly of any relevance.
Lemma 3.5. Suppose x is a variable occurring in a hyperformula F. Then, for any (F-admissible) interpretation ∗,
constant c and subhyperformula G of F, (G[x/c])∗ = G∗[x/c].
Lemma 3.6. For any hyperformula F and (F-admissible) perfect interpretation ∗, the game F∗ (is finitary and) does
not depend on any variables that do not occur free in F; hence, if F is closed, F∗ is a constant game.
Lemma 3.7. For any hyperformula F, (F-admissible) interpretation ∗, and valuations e and f that agree on all free
variables of F, we have e[F∗] = e[( f F)∗].
As we did in [6], with Lemma 3.6 in mind and in accordance with our conventions, as long as a hyperformula F
is closed and an interpretation ∗ is perfect, we can always safely omit the irrelevant valuation parameter e in WnF∗e ,
LrF
∗
e or e[F∗], and simply writeWnF∗ , LrF∗ or F∗.
The following fact, on which we often implicitly rely in this paper, was straightforward in the context of CL3, but
perhaps not quite so in our new context. A formal verification for it is given later in Appendix B.
Fact 3.8. For any hyperformula F and valuation e, whenever an interpretation ∗ is F-admissible, so is the perfect
interpretation Ě induced by (∗, e).
Lemma 3.9. Assume F is a closed hyperformula, e any valuation, ∗ any F-admissible interpretation, and Ě the perfect
interpretation induced by (∗, e). Then e[F∗] = FĚ.
Idea. When F is a closed atom, the effect e[F∗] = FĚ is the very meaning of the perfect interpretation Ě induced by
(∗, e). The same effect seamlessly extends from atoms to compound closed (hyper)formulas.
Proof. Let F , e, ∗, Ě be as above. We may assume that F does not contain hybrid atoms, for if it does, replace F by
its general dehybridization. Of course, ∗ remains admissible for every G that is a subformula of F or the result of
substituting in such a subformula some free occurrences of variables by constants. We prove the lemma by induction
on the complexity of F . If F is an atom, e[F∗] = FĚ is immediate from the definition of the perfect interpretation
induced by (∗, e). And the cases when F is non-atomic with its main operator being among ¬,∧,∨,→,u,unionsq are also
straightforward because e[. . .], ∗, Ě commute with each of these operators. Finally, let F = QxG, where x is a variable
and Q a quantifier. Consider an arbitrary constant c. By Lemma 3.5, G∗[x/c] = (G[x/c])∗ and thus e[G∗[x/c]] =
e[(G[x/c])∗]. But, by the induction hypothesis, e[(G[x/c])∗] = (G[x/c])Ě. Hence e[G∗[x/c]] = (G[x/c])Ě. We can
rewrite the same as e[G∗[x/c]] = e[(G[x/c])Ě] because, by Lemma 3.6, (G[x/c])Ě is a constant game. Again by
Lemma 3.5, (G[x/c])Ě = GĚ[x/c], so that e[G∗[x/c]] = e[GĚ[x/c]]. Thus, for every constant c, e[G∗[x/c]] and
e[GĚ[x/c]] are the same. Now, examining the definitions of ∀,∃,u,unionsq (Section 4 of [6]) and seeing that e[Qx A]
only depends on e[Qx A[x/c]] for c ∈ {0, 1, . . .}, we find e[QxG∗] = e[QxGĚ], i.e. e[F∗] = e[FĚ]. Again, since FĚ
is a constant game, e[FĚ] can be rewritten as FĚ, concluding that e[F∗] = FĚ. 
3.3. Prefixation lemmas
For a game A, we will be using the expression LRA to denote the set of all unilegal runs of A, i.e.
LRA = {Γ | Γ ∈ LrAe for every valuation e}.
Remember the notation Γ γ , ¬Γ and 〈Φ〉A (the Φ-prefixation of A) from [6]. The game 〈Φ〉A – which in this paper
we may sometimes also write just as ΦA – is defined if and only if Φ ∈ LRA. For readability and compactness of
formulations, let us agree that:
Convention 3.10. Every time we write 〈Φ〉A, we implicitly claim that this game is defined, i.e. Φ ∈ LRA.
Lemma 3.11. Let A, A1, . . . , An (n ≥ 2) be any games, x any variable, andΦ any position. For each of the following
clauses, we (explicitly) assume that Φ is a unilegal position of the game to which Φ-prefixation is applied; for clause
3 we also assume that A is x-unistructural. Then:
1. 〈Φ〉¬A = ¬(〈¬Φ〉A).
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2. 〈Φ〉(A1 ∨ · · · ∨ An) = 〈Φ1.〉A1 ∨ · · · ∨ 〈Φn.〉An .
3. 〈Φ〉∃x A = ∃x〈Φ〉A.
Proof. Clauses 1, 2 and 3 of this lemma can be easily proven by induction on the length ofΦ based on clauses 1, 3 and
10 of Lemma 4.7 of [6], respectively, with inductive steps relying on the obvious fact that 〈Φ, ℘α〉B = 〈℘α〉(〈Φ〉B)
(see the footnote 12). Officially, clauses 1 and 2 have been verified in [4] (Lemmas 3.5 and 3.6), and the fact stated in
clause 3 has been observed in Section 11 of [2] (Eq. (8) and the subsequent remark). 
By a choice hyperformula we mean a non-atomic hyperformula whose main operator is u,unionsq,u orunionsq; depending
on that operator, we may more specifically refer to such a hyperformula as a u- unionsq-,u- orunionsq-hyperformula. Henceforth
we usually only deal with balanced (in fact, reasonable) hyperformulas, and their subhyperformulas that are choice
hyperformulas are always simply formulas. However, for uniformity, we will still typically say “choice (u-, etc.)
hyperformula” rather than “choice (u-, etc.) formula”.
A quasiatom of a hyperformula E is a surface occurrence of a subhyperformula in E that is either an atom (of
any of the three sorts) or a choice hyperformula. Note that a quasiatom is not just a subhyperformula but rather a
subhyperformula together with a particular occurrence. E.g., in P ∧ P , the two different occurrences of P present two
different quasiatoms. However, for readability (and by abuse of concepts), we will often identify a quasiatom with
the corresponding hyperformula G, and simply say “the quasiatom G” once it is clear from the context which of the
possibly many occurrences of G wemean. A quasiatom G of a hyperformula E is said to be positive (resp. negative) iff
its occurrence in E is positive (resp. negative). Similarly, such a quasiatom G is elementary, general, hybrid or choice
iff it is an elementary atom, general atom, hybrid atom, or choice hyperformula, respectively. Likewise for other terms
such as n-ary, L-based, same-base etc. A non-elementary (non-choice, etc.) quasiatom means a quasiatom that is not
an elementary (choice, etc.) one.
In Section 7 of [6] we defined the noun “E-specification” and the corresponding verb “to E-specify”, with E being
aCL3-formula, specified objects being surface occurrences of its subformulas, and their E-specifications being strings
acting as sorts of addresses of those occurrences/subformulas in the parse tree for the (∨,∧,→)-structure of E . This
terminology straightforwardly extends to our new context where E can be any hyperformula and E-specified objects
be any surface occurrences of its subhyperformulas, including quasiatoms. Further extending it from quasiatoms to
letters, the E-specification of a given surface occurrence of a letter L means the E-specification of the (non-choice)
quasiatom in which that occurrence of L happens to be. For a hyperformula or letter G, we can say “the occurrence
γ of G in E” to mean the surface occurrence of G in E that is E-specified by γ . Note that while a given string γ
can E-specify the surface occurrence of more than one subhyperformula, the quasiatom or letter E-specified by γ is
always unique. E.g., when E = Q ∧ ¬P(x), two subformulas and one letter of E are E-specified by ‘2.’: ¬P(x),
P(x) and P; however, out of these three expressions, only the second one is a quasiatom and only the third one is a
letter. So, quasiatoms and surface occurrences of letters of a given hyperformula E can be uniquely identified by their
E-specifications.
Where Γ is a run, E a hyperformula, G a quasiatom of E and γ its E-specification, we define Γ γE by:
Γ γE =
{
Γ γ if G is positive in E ;
¬Γ γ if G is negative in E .
By the surface complexity of a hyperformula E we mean the number of surface occurrences of ¬, ∧, ∨,→, ∀, ∃ in
E . A couple of forthcoming lemmas will be proven by induction on surface complexity. In the inductive steps of such
proofs, we will only consider the cases when the main operator is ¬, ∨ or ∃. The cases with ∧,→ and ∀ can be safely
omitted, as these three operators can be considered standard abbreviations in terms of ¬, ∨ and ∃.
According to our earlier conventions from [6], below and elsewhere ℘ ranges over {>,⊥}.
Lemma 3.12. For any hyperformula E, E-admissible interpretation ∗ and run Γ , Γ ∈ LRE∗ iff every labmove
(labeled move) of Γ has the form ℘γβ for some γ that E-specifies a non-elementary quasiatom G of E, such that
Γ γE ∈ LRG
∗
.
Idea. The meaning of the above lemma is that a unilegal run of the game represented by a hyperformula E consists of
unilegal runs of the games represented by the quasiatoms of E , with the roles of the two players switched in negative
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quasiatoms. This is in concordance with the intuition – explained in [6] – that (uni)legal runs of (¬,∨,∧,→,∃,∀)-
combinations of games are nothing but interspersed (uni)legal runs of the component games, with ¬ and → (in its
antecedent) switching players’ roles. The lemma only talks about non-elementary quasiatoms, because elementary
quasiatoms represent games without legal moves, and a legal run of a compound game would never include any
moves made in elementary components of the game.
Proof. We prove Lemma 3.12 by induction on the surface complexity of E . For the basis of induction, assume E is
a quasiatom. If E is an elementary quasiatom and hence E∗ is an elementary game, then Γ ∈ LRE∗ iff Γ = 〈〉,
because, as we remember, 〈〉 is the only legal run of elementary games. And, since in this case E has no non-
elementary quasiatoms, the statement of the lemma is vacuously true. Suppose now E is a non-elementary quasiatom.
The occurrence of E in itself is E-specified by the empty string . Inserting  does not change a string, so every
labmove ℘β of Γ has the form ℘β. And, of course, Γ E = Γ . Therefore, again, what the lemma claims is trivially
true.
For the inductive step, assume E = ¬K . By the definition of ¬, Γ ∈ LRE∗ iff ¬Γ ∈ LRK ∗ . In turn, by the
induction hypothesis, ¬Γ ∈ LRK ∗ iff every labmove of ¬Γ has the form ℘γβ for some γ that K -specifies a non-
elementary quasiatom G of K , such that (¬Γ )γK ∈ LRG
∗
. But notice that the same γ also E-specifies the same
quasiatom G, and that (¬Γ )γK = Γ γE . Hence, the statement of the lemma is correct.
Next, assume E = K1 ∨ · · · ∨ Kn . By the definition of ∨, Γ ∈ LRE∗ iff every labmove of Γ has the form ℘i.α
for some i ∈ {1, . . . , n} and, for each such i , Γ i. ∈ LRK ∗i . In turn, by the induction hypothesis, Γ i. ∈ LRK ∗i iff
every labmove of Γ i. has the form ℘δβ for some δ that Ki -specifies a non-elementary quasiatom G of Ki , such that
(Γ i.)δKi ∈ LRG
∗
. Notice that the same G is a quasiatom of E which is E-specified by i.δ, and that (Γ i.)δKi = Γ i.δE .
Thus, Γ ∈ LRE∗ iff every labmove of Γ has the form ℘i.δβ, where i.δ is the E-specification of a non-elementary
quasiatom G of E , such that Γ i.δE ∈ LRG
∗
. In other words, with i.δ in the role of γ , the statement of the lemma holds.
Finally, assume E = ∃xK . Taking into account that every quasiatom of ∃xK is also a quasiatom of K (and
vice versa) with the same specification and same positive/negative status, this case is straightforward because, by the
definition of ∃, LR∃xK ∗ = LRK ∗ . 
For a run Γ and string γ , we will be using the expression
Γ−γ
to denote the result of deleting in Γ every labmove of the form ℘γβ.
Lemma 3.13. Assume E, F are hyperformulas, G is a quasiatom of E, and H is the result of replacing this quasiatom
by F in E. Further assume γ is the E-specification of G, ∗ is an interpretation admissible for both E and H, and Φ
is a unilegal position of E∗ with 〈ΦγE 〉G∗ = F∗. Then 〈Φ〉E∗ = 〈Φ−γ 〉H∗.
Idea. Let us look at an example with Φ = 〈⊥1.2,>2.1〉. The effect of playing Φ in game (A u B) ∨ (C unionsq D) is
obviously B ∨ C , in the sense that 〈Φ〉((A u B) ∨ (C unionsq D)) = B ∨ C . But the same effect is achieved by just
playing 〈>2.1〉 in B ∨ (C unionsq D). This is so because 〈>2.1〉 is the result of deleting from Φ the move(s) “meant” for
the A u B component of the game, and B is the result of making those very moves in A u B. Thus, Φ can be replaced
by 〈>2.1〉 provided that we also replace A u B by B. One may guess that phenomena such as the just-observed
〈⊥1.2,>2.1〉((A u B) ∨ (C unionsq D)) = 〈>2.1〉(B ∨ (C unionsq D)) are no accident, and this is exactly what Lemma 3.13
asserts. In our example, identifying formulas with their interpretations, E is (A u B) ∨ (C unionsq D), F is B, G is A u B,
H is B ∨ (C unionsq D), and γ is ‘1.’.
Proof. Assume the conditions of the lemma. We proceed by induction on the surface complexity of E .
For the basis, assume E is a quasiatom, so that G = E , H = F , and γ is the empty string . According to one
of the assumptions of the lemma, 〈ΦE 〉G∗ = F∗. Hence, as ΦE = Φ, we have 〈Φ〉G∗ = F∗. The equations G = E
and H = F allow us to rewrite 〈Φ〉G∗ = F∗ as 〈Φ〉E∗ = H∗. Of course H∗ = 〈〉H∗, and thus 〈Φ〉E∗ = 〈〉H∗. But
notice that 〈〉 = 〈Φ−〉, which yields the desired 〈Φ〉E∗ = 〈Φ−〉H∗.
Next, assume E = ¬K . As in the corresponding step of our proof of Lemma 3.12, γ remains the K -specification of
G, and ΦγE = (¬Φ)γK . Also, ¬Φ ∈ LRK
∗
. It is our assumption that 〈ΦγE 〉G∗ = F∗, and therefore 〈(¬Φ)γK 〉G∗ = F∗.
Then, by the induction hypothesis, 〈¬Φ〉K ∗ = 〈(¬Φ)−γ 〉L∗, where L is the result of replacing G by F in K . Hence
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¬(〈¬Φ〉K ∗) = ¬(〈(¬Φ)−γ 〉L∗). By Lemma 3.11(1), ¬(〈¬Φ〉K ∗) = 〈Φ〉E∗ and ¬(〈(¬Φ)−γ 〉L∗) = 〈Φ−γ 〉¬L∗.
Consequently, 〈Φ〉E∗ = 〈Φ−γ 〉¬L∗. But, of course, ¬L∗ = H∗. Thus, 〈Φ〉E∗ = 〈Φ−γ 〉H∗.
Now, assume
E = K1 ∨ K2 ∨ · · · ∨ Kn .
Then, by Lemma 3.11(2),
〈Φ〉E∗ = 〈Φ1.〉K ∗1 ∨ 〈Φ2.〉K ∗2 ∨ · · · ∨ 〈Φn.〉K ∗n . (3)
Let Ki be the disjunct of E that contains G, and let δ be the Ki -specification of G. For simplicity of representation
and without loss of generality, let us assume here that i = 1. Thus, γ = 1.δ, and we have
H = L ∨ K2 ∨ · · · ∨ Kn, (4)
where L is the result of replacing G by F in K1. As γ = 1.δ, for any j 6= 1 we obviously have Φ j. = (Φ−γ ) j..
Hence, (3) can be rewritten as
〈Φ〉E∗ = 〈Φ1.〉K ∗1 ∨ 〈(Φ−γ )2.〉K ∗2 ∨ · · · ∨ 〈(Φ−γ )n.〉K ∗n . (5)
It is our assumption that 〈ΦγE 〉G∗ = F∗, i.e. 〈Φ1.δE 〉G∗ = F∗. But obviously Φ1.δE = (Φ1.)δK1 , and therefore
〈(Φ1.)δK1〉G∗ = F∗. Then, by the induction hypothesis, 〈Φ1.〉K ∗1 = 〈(Φ1.)−δ〉L∗. But it is not hard to see that
(Φ1.)−δ = (Φ−1.δ)1.. Hence, 〈Φ1.〉K ∗1 = 〈(Φ−1.δ)1.〉L∗, i.e. 〈Φ1.〉K ∗1 = 〈(Φ−γ )1.〉L∗. This allows us to rewrite (5)
as
〈Φ〉E∗ = 〈(Φ−γ )1.〉L∗ ∨ 〈(Φ−γ )2.〉K ∗2 ∨ · · · ∨ 〈(Φ−γ )n.〉K ∗n . (6)
Since Φ ∈ LRE∗ , every move of (Φ and hence of) Φ−γ starts with ‘i.’ for some i ∈ {1, . . . , n}. And, with Convention
3.10 in mind, (6) implies that
(Φ−γ )1. ∈ LRL∗ , (Φ−γ )2. ∈ LRK ∗2 , . . . , (Φ−γ )n. ∈ LRK ∗n .
By the definition of ∨, all this means that Φ−γ ∈ LRL∗∨K ∗2∨···∨K ∗n . Then, by Lemma 3.11(2),
〈Φ−γ 〉(L∗ ∨ K ∗2 ∨ · · · ∨ K ∗n ) = 〈(Φ−γ )1.〉L∗ ∨ 〈(Φ−γ )2.〉K ∗2 ∨ · · · ∨ 〈(Φ−γ )n.〉K ∗n .
The above, in conjunction with (6) and (4), yields the desired 〈Φ〉E∗ = 〈Φ−γ 〉H∗.
Finally, in view of Lemma 3.11(3), the case E = ∃xK is rather straightforward. This is so because LR∃xK ∗ =
LRK
∗
and, as pointed out in our proof of Lemma 3.12, every quasiatom of ∃xK is also a quasiatom of K (and vice
versa) with the same specification and same positive/negative status. 
3.4. Manageability
Definition 3.14. Let E be a reasonable hyperformula. We say that a run Γ is E-manageable iff each of the following
three conditions is satisfied:
1. Every labmove of Γ has the form ℘γα, where γ E-specifies either a general or a hybrid quasiatom.
2. Whenever pi is the E-specification of a positive hybrid quasiatom and ν is the E-specification of the same-base
negative hybrid quasiatom, Γpi is a >-delay of ¬Γ ν .
3. Whenever γ is the E-specification of a general quasiatom, Γ γ contains no >-labeled moves.
The above concept will play a central role in our soundness proof for CL4, with manageability being a certain nice
property helping > to succeed. In rough intuitive terms, condition 1 means that the play has only been taking place in
atoms, so that the logical structure of the game has not been affected, and it continues to be precisely described by E .
Condition 2 ensures that the (sub)plays in the “matched” occurrences of atoms are in a sense symmetric, so that a win
in at least one of them is guaranteed. And condition 3 signifies that > has not made any hasty moves in unmatched
atoms, so that, if and when at some later point such an atom finds a match, by copying its adversary’s moves, > will
still have a chance to even out the corresponding two subplays.
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Lemma 3.15. Assume E is a reasonable hyperformula, ∗ an E-admissible interpretation, and Γ an infinite run with
arbitrarily long finite initial segments that are E-manageable unilegal positions of E∗. Then Γ is an E-manageable
unilegal run of E∗.
Proof. Assume the conditions of the lemma. By condition (a) of Definition 2.1 of [6], Γ is in LRE
∗
because it has
arbitrarily long initial segments that are in LRE
∗
. And obviously Γ satisfies conditions 1 and 3 of Definition 3.14
because it has arbitrarily long initial segments that satisfy those conditions. So, what remains to show is that Γ also
satisfies condition 2. Suppose, for a contradiction, that pi and ν are as in condition 2 but Γpi is not a >-delay of ¬Γ ν .
This means that at least one of the following two statements is true:
(i) For one of the players ℘, the subsequence of the ℘-labeled moves of Γpi (i.e. the result of deleting in Γpi all
¬℘-labeled moves) is not the same as that of ¬Γ ν , or
(ii) For some k, n, in ¬Γ ν the nth >-labeled move is made later than the kth ⊥-labeled move, but in Γpi the nth
>-labeled move is made earlier than the kth ⊥-labeled move.
Whether (i) or (ii) is the case, it is not hard to see that, beginning from some (finite) m, every initial segment Ψ of Γ
of length ≥ m will satisfy the same (i) or (ii) in the role of Γ , and hence Ψ will not be an E-manageable position of
E∗. This contradicts the assumptions of our lemma. 
Lemma 3.16. Assume E is a reasonable hyperformula, ∗ an E-admissible interpretation, and Ω an E-manageable
unilegal position of E∗. Suppose γ is the E-specification of a negative (resp. positive) quasiatom G1 u · · · uGn (resp.
G1 unionsq · · · unionsq Gn), and i ∈ {1, . . . , n}. Let H be the result of replacing in E the above quasiatom by Gi . Then:
1. Ω is H-manageable;
2. 〈Ω ,>γ i〉E∗ = 〈Ω〉H∗.
Proof. Assume the conditions of the lemma. It is not hard to see that, with Ω in the role of Γ , each of the thee
conditions of Definition 3.14 is inherited by H from E . This takes care of clause 1. Since Ω does not contain
γ -prefixed moves (for, otherwise, by condition 1 of Definition 3.14, it would not be E-manageable), we have
〈Ω ,>γ i〉γ = 〈>i〉 and 〈Ω ,>γ i〉−γ = Ω . By clause 5 (resp. 6) of Lemma 4.7 of [6], the fact 〈Ω ,>γ i〉γ = 〈>i〉
implies 〈Ω ,>γ i〉γE (G1 u · · · u Gn)∗ = G∗i (resp. 〈Ω ,>γ i〉γE (G1 unionsq · · · unionsq Gn)∗ = G∗i ); and Lemma 3.12 guarantees
〈Ω ,>γ i〉 ∈ LRE∗ . Then, by Lemma 3.13, the fact 〈Ω ,>γ i〉−γ = Ω implies 〈Ω ,>γ i〉E∗ = 〈Ω〉H∗. This proves
clause 2. 
Lemma 3.17. Assume E is a reasonable hyperformula, ∗ an E-admissible interpretation, and Ω an E-manageable
unilegal position of E∗. Suppose γ is the E-specification of a negative (resp. positive) quasiatom uxG(x) (resp.unionsqxG(x)), and c is any constant. Let H be the result of replacing in E the above quasiatom by G(c). Then:
1. Ω is H-manageable;
2. 〈Ω ,>γ c〉E∗ = 〈Ω〉H∗.
Proof. This lemma is very similar to the previous one. The only difference in the proof would be that, when claiming
〈Ω ,>γ c〉γE
(uxG(x))∗ = (G(c))∗ (resp. 〈Ω ,>γ c〉γE(unionsqxG(x))∗ = (G(c))∗), we would need to rely on clause 7
(resp. 8) of Lemma 4.7 of [6] in conjunction with Lemma 3.5. 
Lemma 3.18. Assume A is a static game, e is any valuation, and Γ ,∆ are runs such that∆ is a>-delay of Γ . Then:
1. If ∆ is a >-illegal run of e[A], then so is Γ .
2. If Γ is a ⊥-illegal run of e[A], then so is ∆.
Proof. The above is a fact known from [2] (Lemma 4.7). 
Lemma 3.19. Assume E is a reasonable hyperformula, ∗ an E-admissible interpretation, and Ω an E-manageable
unilegal position of E∗. Suppose H is the hyperformula that results from E by replacing in it a positive
surface occurrence pi and a negative surface occurrence ν of a general letter P by a hybrid letter Pq ,
such that H remains reasonable. Further assume Ωpi = 〈⊥pi1, . . . ,⊥pin〉 and Ων = 〈⊥ν1, . . . ,⊥νm〉. Then
〈Ω ,>piν1, . . . ,>piνm,>νpi1, . . . ,>νpin〉 is an H-manageable unilegal position of H∗.
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Proof. Assume the conditions of the lemma. Let
Φ = 〈Ω ,>piν1, . . . ,>piνm,>νpi1, . . . ,>νpin〉.
Notice that
ΦpiH = Φpi = 〈⊥pi1, . . . ,⊥pin,>ν1, . . . ,>νm〉 (7)
and
ΦνH = ¬Φν = 〈>ν1, . . . ,>νm,⊥pi1, . . . ,⊥pin〉. (8)
As we see,
ΦpiH is a >-delay of ΦνH . (9)
This implies that Φ is H -manageable, because conditions 1 and 3 of Definition 3.14 are obviously inherited by H and
Φ from E and Ω , and so is condition 2 for any relevant pair (pi ′, ν′) different from (pi, ν).
What remains to show is that Φ ∈ LRH∗ . For this, in view of Lemma 3.12, it would be sufficient to verify that
ΦpiH ∈ LRP
∗(Et) and ΦνH ∈ LRP
∗(Et ′), where Pq(Et) and Pq(Et ′) are the two – respectively positive and negative – Pq -
based atoms of E . This is sufficient because for any other (different from pi , ν) relevant γ , the similar condition is
inherited by H and Φ from E and Ω as we have Φγ = Ωγ .
Since Ω ∈ LRE∗ , by Lemma 3.12 we have both ΩpiE ∈ LRP
∗(Et) and ΩνE ∈ LRP
∗(Et ′). Thus,
〈⊥pi1, . . . ,⊥pin〉 ∈ LRP∗(Et); (10)
〈>ν1, . . . ,>νm〉 ∈ LRP∗(Et ′). (11)
Suppose ΦpiH 6∈ LRP
∗(Et), i.e., for some valuation e, ΦpiH 6∈ LrP
∗(Et)
e = Lre[P∗(Et)]. By (7), this can be rewritten as
〈⊥pi1, . . . ,⊥pin,>ν1, . . . ,>νm〉 6∈ Lre[P∗(Et)]. In view of (10), ΦpiH cannot be a ⊥-illegal position of e[P∗(Et)]. So, it
must be>-illegal. But then, by (9) and Lemma 3.18(1), ΦνH is a>-illegal position of e[P∗(Et)]. Hence, by Lemma 3.4,
ΦνH is a >-illegal position of e[P∗(Et ′)]. This, however, is in obvious contradiction with (8) and (11).
Suppose now ΦνH 6∈ LRP
∗(Et ′), i.e. ΦνH 6∈ Lre[P
∗(Et ′)] for some valuation e. This case is similar/symmetric to the
previous one. By (8) and (11), ΦνH cannot be a >-illegal position of e[P∗(Et ′)]. So, it must be ⊥-illegal. But then, by
(9) and Lemma 3.18(2), ΦpiH is a ⊥-illegal position of e[P∗(Et ′)] and hence (by Lemma 3.4) of e[P∗(Et)]. This is in
contradiction with (7) and (10). 
Lemma 3.20. Assume E is a reasonable hyperformula, α is any move, ∗ is an E-admissible interpretation, Ω is an
E-manageable position, and 〈Ω ,⊥α〉 ∈ LRE∗ . Then one of the following conditions is satisfied:
(i) α = γβ, where γ is the E-specification of a general quasiatom. In this case 〈Ω ,⊥α〉 is an E-manageable
unilegal position of E∗.
(ii) α = γβ, where γ is the E-specification of a hybrid quasiatom. Let σ be the E-specification of the other same-
base hybrid quasiatom. Then 〈Ω ,⊥γβ,>σβ〉 is an E-manageable unilegal position of E∗.
(iii) α = γ i , where γ is the E-specification of a positive (resp. negative) quasiatom G1u· · ·uGn (resp. G1unionsq· · ·unionsqGn)
and i ∈ {1, . . . , n}. In this case, where H is the result of replacing in E the above quasiatom by Gi , we have:
1. Ω is H-manageable;
2. 〈Ω ,⊥α〉E∗ = 〈Ω〉H∗.
(iv) α = γ c, where γ is the E-specification of a positive (resp. negative) quasiatomuxG(x) (resp.unionsqxG(x)) and c
is a constant. In this case, where H is the result of replacing in E the above quasiatom by G(c), we have:
1. Ω is H-manageable;
2. 〈Ω ,⊥α〉E∗ = 〈Ω〉H∗.
Proof. Assume E , α, ∗, Ω are as the first sentence of the lemma stipulates. By Lemma 3.12, the condition
〈Ω ,⊥α〉 ∈ LRE∗ implies that α should be γβ, where γ is a E-specification of a non-elementary quasiatom F of
E . Fix these γ , β and F . As a non-elementary quasiatom, F should be either (i) a general atom, or (ii) a hybrid atom,
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or (iii) a u- or unionsq-(hyper)formula, or (iv) a u- or unionsq-(hyper)formula. We consider each of these four possibilities –
corresponding to the four conditions (i)–(iv) of the lemma – separately.
Case (i): F is a general atom. Obviously adding to a E-manageable position (Ω ) a ⊥-labeled move whose
prefix E-specifies a general quasiatom again yields an E-manageable position. So, 〈Ω ,⊥α〉 is E-manageable; by
the assumptions of the lemma, it is also a unilegal position of E∗. Thus, condition (i) of Lemma 3.20 is satisfied.
Case (ii): F is a hybrid atom Pq(Et). Let Pq(Et ′) be the other Pq -based quasiatom of E and σ its E-specification, so
that γ, σ are as in (the condition of) condition (ii) of the lemma. We want to show that then the rest of that condition
is also satisfied, i.e. that 〈Ω ,⊥γβ,>σβ〉 is an E-manageable unilegal position of E∗.
Subcase (ii).1: Assume Pq(Et) is negative in E and Pq(Et ′) is positive. Since Ω is E-manageable, Ωσ is a >-
delay of ¬Ωγ . Therefore 〈Ωσ ,>β〉 is a >-delay of 〈¬Ωγ ,>β〉, i.e. of ¬〈Ωγ ,⊥β〉. From here, observing that
〈Ωσ ,>β〉 = 〈Ω ,⊥γβ,>σβ〉σ and 〈Ωγ ,⊥β〉 = 〈Ω ,⊥γβ,>σβ〉γ , we get:
〈Ω ,⊥γβ,>σβ〉σ is a >-delay of ¬〈Ω ,⊥γβ,>σβ〉γ . (12)
Remembering the assumption that Ω is E-manageable and taking into account that for any relevant δ 6= γ, σ we have
〈Ω ,⊥γβ,>σβ〉δ = Ω δ , (12) is obviously sufficient to conclude that
〈Ω ,⊥γβ,>σβ〉 is E-manageable. (13)
According to the assumptions of the lemma, 〈Ω ,⊥γβ〉 ∈ LRE∗ . By Lemma 3.12, this implies that 〈Ω ,⊥γβ〉γE ∈
LRP
∗(Et), i.e. ¬〈Ω ,⊥γβ〉γ ∈ LRP∗(Et). But ¬〈Ω ,⊥γβ〉γ = ¬〈Ω ,⊥γβ,>σβ〉γ because γ 6= σ . Thus,
¬〈Ω ,⊥γβ,>σβ〉γ ∈ LRP∗(Et). Then, by (12) and Lemma 3.18(1), 〈Ω ,⊥γβ,>σβ〉σ is not a >-illegal position of
e[P∗(Et)] (whatever valuation e) and hence – by Lemma 3.4 – of e[P∗(Et ′)]. It is not a ⊥-illegal position of e[P∗(Et ′)]
either, for otherwise we would have 〈Ω ,⊥γβ〉σ 6∈ LRP∗(Et ′) which, in view of Lemma 3.12, contradicts our assumption
that 〈Ω ,⊥γβ〉 ∈ LRE∗ . Thus, 〈Ω ,⊥γβ,>σβ〉σ ∈ LRP∗(Et ′). Now, taking into account that for any δ 6= σ that E-
specifies a quasiatom of E we clearly have 〈Ω ,⊥γβ,>σβ〉δ = 〈Ω ,⊥γβ〉δ , Lemma 3.12 in conjunction with our
assumption 〈Ω ,⊥γβ〉 ∈ LRE∗ implies that 〈Ω ,⊥γβ,>σβ〉 ∈ LRE∗ . This, together with (13), means that condition
(ii) of Lemma 3.20 is satisfied.
Subcase (ii).2: Now assume Pq(Et) is positive in E and Pq(Et ′) is negative. By the E-manageability of Ω , Ωγ is a>-
delay of¬Ωσ , whence 〈Ωγ ,⊥β〉 is a>-delay of 〈¬Ωσ ,⊥β〉 = ¬〈Ωσ ,>β〉. Then, as 〈Ωγ ,⊥β〉 = 〈Ω ,⊥γβ,>σβ〉γ
and 〈Ωσ ,>β〉 = 〈Ω ,⊥γβ,>σβ〉σ , we get:
〈Ω ,⊥γβ,>σβ〉γ is a >-delay of ¬〈Ω ,⊥γβ,>σβ〉σ . (14)
From here, just as from (12) in Subcase (ii).1, we can conclude that statement (13) is true.
Next, as noted in Subcase (ii).1, 〈Ω ,⊥γβ〉γE ∈ LRP
∗(Et), which now simply means that 〈Ω ,⊥γβ〉γ ∈ LRP∗(Et).
Then 〈Ω ,⊥γβ,>σβ〉γ , which equals 〈Ω ,⊥γβ〉γ , is not a ⊥-illegal position of e[P∗(Et)] (whatever valuation e).
Therefore, by (14) and Lemma 3.18(2), ¬〈Ω ,⊥γβ,>σβ〉σ is not a ⊥-illegal position of e[P∗(Et)] and hence, by
Lemma 3.4, of e[P∗(Et ′)]. But ¬〈Ω ,⊥γβ,>σβ〉σ , being equal to 〈¬Ω ,>γβ,⊥σβ〉σ , is not a >-illegal position
of e[P∗(Et ′)], either, for otherwise we would have 〈¬Ω ,>γβ〉σ 6∈ LRP∗(Et ′), i.e. ¬〈Ω ,⊥γβ〉σ 6∈ LRP∗(Et ′), i.e.
〈Ω ,⊥γβ〉σE 6∈ LRP
∗(Et ′), and this, by Lemma 3.12, contradicts our assumption that 〈Ω ,⊥γβ〉 ∈ LRE∗ . Thus,
〈Ω ,⊥γβ,>σβ〉σ ∈ LRP∗(Et ′). From here, as in Subcase (ii).1, we can conclude that condition (ii) of Lemma 3.20 is
satisfied.
Case (iii): F is G1u· · ·uGn or G1unionsq· · ·unionsqGn . We want to show that then (the rest of) condition (iii) of Lemma 3.20
is satisfied. Since Ω is E-manageable, clause 1 of Definition 3.14 implies that Ω does not contain γ -prefixed moves.
Therefore we have:
〈Ω ,⊥γβ〉γ = 〈⊥γβ〉γ ; (15)
〈Ω ,⊥γβ〉−γ = Ω . (16)
By (15) and Lemma 3.12, 〈⊥γβ〉γE ∈ LRF
∗
. In view of clauses 5(a) and 6(a) of Lemma 4.7 of [6], this is the case
when β = i ∈ {1, . . . , n} and either F = G1 u · · · u Gn and F is positive in E (so that 〈⊥γβ〉γE = 〈⊥i〉), or
F = G1 unionsq · · · unionsq Gn and F is negative in E (so that 〈⊥γβ〉γE = 〈>i〉). In either case, by clauses 5(b) and 6(b)
of the same lemma, we have 〈⊥γβ〉γE F∗ = G∗i . By (15), this means that 〈Ω ,⊥γβ〉γE F∗ = G∗i . Then, according
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to Lemma 3.13, 〈Ω ,⊥γβ〉E∗ = 〈Ω ,⊥γβ〉−γ H∗, where H is the result of replacing in E the quasiatom F by Gi .
Applying (16) and changing γβ back to α, the just-derived equation can be rewritten as 〈Ω ,⊥α〉E∗ = 〈Ω〉H∗. To
conclude that condition (iii) of Lemma 3.20 is satisfied, it remains to notice that Ω is H -manageable. This is so for
the same reasons as in Lemma 3.16.
Case (iv): F isuxG(x) orunionsqxG(x). This case is similar to the previous one, only we need to use clauses 7 and 8
(instead of 5 and 6) of Lemma 4.7 of [6], and also rely on Lemma 3.5 when doing so. 
3.5. Finalization
We define the relation ≤ on elementary games by stipulating that A ≤ B iff, for every valuation e, whenever e[A]
is true, so is e[B]. Informally this can be read as “B is at least as true as A”.
Lemma 3.21. Assume p1 and p2 are same-arity elementary letters; F1 is an elementary formula; F2 is the result of
replacing in F1 a positive (resp. negative) occurrence of p1 by p2; and ∗ is an interpretation such that p∗1 and p∗2 have
the same canonical tuple, with p∗2 ≤ p∗1 (resp. p∗1 ≥ p∗2). Then F∗2 ≤ F∗1 .
Idea. The above lemma, in fact, does nothing but rephrases, in our terms, a well known fact from classical logic. Let
us not be lazy to still verify it for safety.
Proof. Assume the conditions of the lemma. Let (x1, . . . , xn) be the canonical tuple of p∗1 and p∗2 , and p1(t1, . . . , tn)
be the atom of F1 in which p1 got replaced by p2 when obtaining F2. We proceed by induction on the complexity of
F1. As was done earlier, the inductive step will be limited to the cases when the main operator of F1 is ¬, ∨ or ∃.
If F1 is atomic, then F1 = p1(t1, . . . , tn) and F2 = p2(t1, . . . , tn). The occurrence of p1 in F1 is thus positive
and hence, by the conditions of the lemma, p∗2 ≤ p∗1 . Pick any valuation e. Let g be the valuation that agrees with
e on all variables that are not among x1, . . . , xn , such that g(x1) = e(t1), . . . , g(xn) = e(tn). By Definition 4.1
of [6], e[p∗1(t1, . . . , tn)] = g[p∗1(x1, . . . , xn)] and e[p∗2(t1, . . . , tn)] = g[p∗2(x1, . . . , xn)]. But p∗2 ≤ p∗1 implies
that, whenever g[p∗2(x1, . . . , xn)] is true, so is g[p∗1(x1, . . . , xn)]; hence, whenever e[p∗2(t1, . . . , tn)] is true, so is
e[p∗1(t1, . . . , tn)]. As e was arbitrary, we conclude that F∗2 ≤ F∗1 .
Suppose now F1 = ¬G1. Then F2 = ¬G2, where the conditions of the lemma are satisfied with G2,G1, p2, p1
in the role of F1, F2, p1, p2, respectively (the subscripts 1 and 2 have been interchanged because what was positive in
F1, F2, is negative in G1,G2, and vice versa). Hence, by the induction hypothesis, G∗1 ≤ G∗2. This obviously means¬G∗2 ≤ ¬G∗1, i.e. F∗2 ≤ F∗1 .
Next, suppose F1 is a disjunction. Without loss of generality, we may assume that the replaced occurrence of p1
happens to be in the first disjunct. So, F1 has the form G1 ∨ H1 ∨ · · · ∨ Hn and F2 is G2 ∨ H1 ∨ · · · ∨ Hn , where
the conditions of the lemma are satisfied with G1 and G2 in the role of F1 and F2, respectively. By the induction
hypothesis, G∗2 ≤ G∗1. Obviously this implies F∗2 ≤ F∗1 .
Finally, suppose F1 = ∃xG1, so that we have F2 = ∃xG2, where the conditions of the lemma are satisfied with
G1 and G2 in the role of F1 and F2, respectively. Pick any valuation e and assume e[∃xG∗2] is true. By the definition
of ∃, this means that g[G∗2] is true for some valuation g that agrees with e on all variables except perhaps x . But, by
the induction hypothesis, G∗2 ≤ G∗1, so that, for that g, g[G∗1] is also true. Consequently, e[∃xG∗1] is true. Since e was
arbitrary, we conclude that F∗2 ≤ F∗1 . 
Now we introduce the operation 〈Γ 〉 ↓ A of the type {runs}×{games} → {elementary games}, which is rather
similar to prefixation. The meaning of the predicate 〈Γ 〉↓A, which we call the Γ -finalization of A, is “Γ is a >-won
run of e[A]”. That is, 〈Γ 〉↓A is true at e iffWnAe 〈Γ 〉 = >. This operation is only defined when Γ is a unilegal run of
A. Here is an official definition:
Definition 3.22. Let A be any game and Γ a unilegal run of A. 〈Γ 〉↓ A is defined by: Lr〈Γ 〉↓Ae = {〈〉};Wn〈Γ 〉↓Ae 〈〉 =
WnAe 〈Γ 〉.
Extending Convention 3.10 to finalization, every time we write 〈Γ 〉 ↓ A, we implicitly claim that this game is
defined, i.e. Γ ∈ LRA. The following fact is immediate from the relevant definitions:
Lemma 3.23. For any games A, A1, . . . , An (n ≥ 2) we have:
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1. 〈〉↓(A1 u · · · u An) = 〈〉↓ux A = >.
2. 〈〉↓(A1 unionsq · · · unionsq An) = 〈〉↓unionsqx A = ⊥.
The following lemma, which is very similar to (but somewhat simpler than) Lemma 3.11, can be verified by a
routine analysis of the relevant definitions:
Lemma 3.24. Let A, A1, . . . , An (n ≥ 2) be any games, x any variable, and Γ any run. For each of the following
clauses, we assume that Γ is a unilegal run of the game to which Γ -finalization is applied; for clause 3 we also assume
that A is x-unistructural. Then:
1. 〈Γ 〉↓¬A = ¬(〈¬Γ 〉↓A).
2. 〈Γ 〉↓(A1 ∨ · · · ∨ An) = 〈Γ 1.〉↓A1 ∨ · · · ∨ 〈Γ n.〉↓An .
3. 〈Γ 〉↓∃x A = ∃x〈Γ 〉↓A.
Immediately based on Definition 3.22 and the definition of substitution of variables (Definition 4.1 of [6]), we also
easily find that the following is true:
Lemma 3.25. Let A be a game, Ex an n-tuple of pairwise distinct variables, Et any n-tuple of terms, and Γ a unilegal
run of A. Then (〈Γ 〉↓A)[Ex/Et] = 〈Γ 〉↓(A[Ex/Et]).
Lemma 3.26. Assume E, F are hyperformulas, G is a quasiatom of E, and H is the result of replacing this quasiatom
by F in E. Further assume γ is the E-specification of G, ∗ is an interpretation admissible for both E and H, and Γ
is a unilegal run of E∗ with 〈Γ γE 〉↓G∗ = F∗. Then 〈Γ 〉↓E∗ = 〈Γ−γ 〉↓H∗.
Proof. This lemma is very similar to Lemma 3.13, and the proof of the latter can be literally repeated here as long as
in it we replace Φ by Γ , prefixation by finalization, and references to Lemma 3.11 by references to Lemma 3.24. 
Lemma 3.27. Assume E is a stable, reasonable, closed hyperformula, ∗ is an E-admissible perfect interpretation,5
and Γ is an E-manageable (uni)legal run of E∗. ThenWnE∗〈Γ 〉 = >.
Idea. In the role of E , let us take the obviously stable hyperformula S∨¬Pq ∨
(
(Pq ∧uxQ(x)∧ (r ∨¬r)). Consider
the E-manageable run Γ = 〈⊥1.α,⊥2.β,⊥3.1.δ,>2.δ,>3.1.β〉, and assume it is in LRE (by abuse of concepts,
here we identify hyperformulas with their interpretations). Applying Lemma 3.26 as many times as the number of
non-elementary quasiatoms of E , we find that 〈Γ 〉↓E is the proposition(〈⊥α〉↓S) ∨ ¬(〈>β,⊥δ〉↓Pq) ∨ ((〈⊥δ,>β〉↓Pq)) ∧ (〈〉↓uxQ(x)) ∧ (r ∨ ¬r)). (17)
Remembering the meaning of finalization, our lemma’s claim that Γ is a >-won run of E means nothing but that
〈Γ 〉 ↓ E , i.e. (17), is true. So, what we want to understand is why (17) is guaranteed to be true. Let us look at the
elementarization
⊥∨ ¬q ∨ (q ∧> ∧ (r ∨ ¬r)) (18)
of E . It is a tautology due to the stability of E . We now want to see that (17) has to be “at least as true” as (18). First
of all, note that, by Lemma 3.23, the 〈〉 ↓uxQ(x) part of (17) is identical to the corresponding part > of (18). The
applicability of Lemma 3.23 here is not just a lucky coincidence, and in the general case is guaranteed by clause 1 of
Definition 3.14, according to which a manageable run would never contain moves made in choice subcomponents of
the game such as – in our case – uxQ(x). Next, while the 〈⊥α〉 ↓ S part of (17) is not necessarily the same as the
corresponding part ⊥ of (18), at least the former can never be “more false” than the latter, so it is fine if we show the
truth of (17) while generously seeing in it ⊥ instead of 〈⊥α〉↓S. Again, remembering what elementarization does to
general atoms such as – in our case – S, this sort of a “not more false” situation with general-letter-related components
is not an accident. Thus, what would suffice now to see is the truth of
⊥∨ ¬(〈>β,⊥δ〉↓Pq) ∨ ((〈⊥δ,>β〉↓Pq)) ∧> ∧ (r ∨ ¬r)). (19)
5 In fact, the conditions that E is closed and ∗ is perfect could be dropped here, but why bother.
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Let us look at the following formula, which is a substitutional instance of the tautological (18) and hence true:
⊥∨ ¬(〈>β,⊥δ〉↓Pq) ∨ ((〈>β,⊥δ〉↓Pq)) ∧> ∧ (r ∨ ¬r)). (20)
The two formulas (19) and (20) only differ in the first conjunct of the third disjunct. So, to conclude that (19) is true, it
would be sufficient to see that 〈⊥δ,>β〉↓Pq is “at least as true” as 〈>β,⊥δ〉↓Pq . But this is indeed so: by condition
2 of Definition 3.14, 〈⊥δ,>β〉 is a >-delay of 〈>β,⊥δ〉, and therefore – by the property of static games – the former
is won by > as long as the latter is so; in other words, 〈>β,⊥δ〉↓Pq ≤ 〈⊥δ,>β〉↓Pq .
Proof. Assume the conditions of the lemma. Since Γ ∈ LRE∗ , by Lemma 3.12, every labmove of Γ has the form
℘γβ, where γ is the E-specification of a non-elementary quasiatom G. If such a G is H1 u · · · u Hn or uxH , as
Γ is E-manageable, we have Γ γE = 〈〉 and hence, by clause 1 of Lemma 3.23, 〈Γ γE 〉 ↓ G∗ = >. Similarly, if G is
H1 unionsq · · · unionsq Hn orunionsqxH , clause 2 of the same lemma yields 〈Γ γE 〉↓G∗ = ⊥. Thus we have:
If γ E-specifies a u- oru-quasiatom G, then 〈Γ γE 〉↓G∗ = >∗.
If γ E-specifies a unionsq- orunionsq-quasiatom G, then 〈Γ γE 〉↓G∗ = ⊥∗. (21)
For each string γ that E-specifies a general or hybrid quasiatom G, let us fix a non-logical elementary letter rγ not
occurring in E (neither directly nor as the elementary component of a hybrid letter). We require that the arity of such
an rγ be 0 if G is a general atom, and be the same as the arity of G if the latter happens to be a hybrid atom. We also
require that all these rγ be pairwise distinct. The official definition views interpretations as total functions — ones
defined for all letters of the language. This is only for convenience, and obviously nothing will change if we assume
in this proof that originally ∗ is only defined for the letters occurring in E . Then we can extend ∗ to other letters –
specifically, the above rγ – in an arbitrary way that serves our goal. This is what will be done in the following two
paragraphs.
For a γ that E-specifies a general quasiatom G, we let r∗γ be 〈Γ γE 〉↓G∗. The latter is defined, i.e. Γ γE ∈ LRG
∗
, by
Lemma 3.12 and our assumption that Γ ∈ LRE∗ . Let us mark this for future references:
If γ E-specifies a general quasiatom G, then 〈Γ γE 〉↓G∗ = r∗γ . (22)
Next, consider a γ that E-specifies an n-ary hybrid quasiatom Pq(Et), with Et abbreviating t1, . . . , tn . Let Pq(Et ′) =
Pq(t ′1, . . . , t ′n) be the other Pq -based quasiatom of E . Assume (Ex) = (x1, . . . , xn) is the canonical tuple of P∗. Let Ey
be the result of deleting in x1, . . . , xn every xi such that at least one of the terms ti , t ′i is a variable. And let Ez be the
result of deleting in x1, . . . , xn every xi such that both ti and t ′i are constants. For convenience of representation and
without loss of generality, we assume here that all variables from Ey go before all variables from Ez in Ex ; that is, for some
m (fix it) with 1 ≤ m ≤ n, we have Ey = x1, . . . , xm and Ez = xm+1, . . . , xn . So, we can rewrite P∗(Ex) as P∗(Ey, Ez). The
reasonableness of E implies that tm+1 = t ′m+1, . . . , tn = t ′n . Let Ec = tm+1, . . . , tn , Eh = t1, . . . , tm and Eh′ = t ′1, . . . , t ′m .
So, we can rewrite Pq(Et) as Pq(Eh, Ec) and Pq(t ′) as Pq(Eh′, Ec). As we agreed, for each i ∈ {1, . . . ,m}, either ti or t ′i is
a variable and hence – since E is closed – its occurrence within Pq(Et) or Pq(Et ′) is blindly bound (it cannot be bound
by a choice quantifier because the occurrences of Pq(Et) and Pq(Et ′) are surface ones). Then the E-admissibility of ∗
implies that P∗(Ey, Ez) – and hence obviously P∗(Ey, Ec) – is unistructural in each of the variables of Ey. Based on this, it
is not hard to see that the games P∗(Ey, Ec) and P∗(Eh, Ec) are equistructural. But, since Γ ∈ LRE∗ , by Lemma 3.12, we
have Γ γE ∈ LRP
∗(Eh,Ec). Consequently, Γ γE ∈ LRP
∗(Ey,Ec), and hence the game 〈Γ γE 〉↓ P∗(Ey, Ec) is defined. This makes it
possible for us to extend ∗ to rγ by stipulating that ∗ interprets it as the predicate r∗γ (Ey, Ez), with
r∗γ (Ey, Ez) = 〈Γ γE 〉↓P∗(Ey, Ec).
Note that r∗γ (Ey, Ez) does not depend on Ez which is just a “place filler” to match the requirement that rγ is n-ary.6 Now:
• 〈Γ γE 〉↓
(
Pq(Et)
)∗ = 〈Γ γE 〉↓P∗(Eh, Ec)— just rewriting (Pq(Et))∗ as P∗(Et) and then (Et) as (Eh, Ec);
6 Of course, from the very beginning we could have chosen rγ to be m-ary rather than n-ary. But we were lazy to explain what m was at the time
when the arity of rγ was chosen. This could also have made clumsy some of our forthcoming definitions.
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• 〈Γ γE 〉↓P∗(Eh, Ec) = 〈Γ γE 〉↓
((
P∗(Ey, Ec))[Ey/Eh])— rewriting P∗(Eh, Ec) as (P∗(Ey, Ec))[Ey/Eh];
• 〈Γ γE 〉↓
((
P∗(Ey, Ec))[Ey/Eh]) = 〈Γ γE 〉↓((P∗(Ey, Ec))[Ey/Eh, Ez/Ec]) — vacuously as P∗(Ey, Ec) does not depend on Ez and
hence
(
P∗(Ey, Ec))[Ey/Eh] = (P∗(Ey, Ec))[Ey/Eh, Ez/Ec];
• 〈Γ γE 〉↓
((
P∗(Ey, Ec))[Ey/Eh, Ez/Ec]) = (〈Γ γE 〉↓(P∗(Ey, Ec)))[Ey/Eh, Ez/Ec]— by Lemma 3.25;
•
(
〈Γ γE 〉↓
(
P∗(Ey, Ec)))[Ey/Eh, Ez/Ec] = (r∗γ (Ey, Ez))[Ey/Eh, Ez/Ec]— by our definition of r∗γ ;
• (r∗γ (Ey, Ez))[Ey/Eh, Ez/Ec] = r∗γ (Et)— just rewriting (r∗γ (Ey, Ez))[Ey/Eh, Ez/Ec] as r∗γ (Eh, Ec) and then (Eh, Ec) as (Et).
The above chain of equations yields 〈Γ γE 〉↓
(
Pq(Et)
)∗ = r∗γ (Et). Generalizing to all γ , we thus have:
If γ E-specifies a hybrid quasiatom Pq(Et), then 〈Γ γE 〉↓
(
Pq(Et)
)∗ = r∗γ (Et). (23)
Claim 1. Assume pi is the E-specification of a positive hybrid quasiatom, and ν is the E-specification of the same-base
negative hybrid quasiatom. Then r∗ν and r∗pi have the same canonical tuple, and r∗ν ≤ r∗pi .
To verify this claim, assume its conditions, and assume the hybrid quasiatoms that are E-specified by pi and ν are
Pq -based. Let (Ex) be the canonical tuple of P∗. We may assume that (Ex) = (Ey, Ez), where Ey, Ez are as in the paragraph
following (22), and so is Ec. Then, according to the stipulation of that paragraph, r∗pi = r∗pi (Ey, Ez) = 〈Γpi 〉↓P∗(Ey, Ec) and
r∗ν = r∗ν (Ey, Ez) = 〈¬Γ ν〉 ↓ P∗(Ey, Ec). But, by condition 2 of Definition 3.14, Γpi is a >-delay of ¬Γ ν . Therefore, as
P∗(Ey, Ez) and hence P∗(Ey, Ec) is a static game, 〈¬Γ ν〉 ↓ P∗(Ey, Ec) ≤ 〈Γpi 〉 ↓ P∗(Ey, Ec). Thus, r∗ν ≤ r∗pi , and Claim 1 is
proven.
Let E1 denote the result of replacing in E : (1) every u- and u- (resp. unionsq- and unionsq-) quasiatom by > (resp. ⊥); (2)
every surface occurrence γ of each general atom by rγ ; and (3) every surface occurrence γ of each hybrid letter7 by
rγ ; From (21), (22) and (23), applying Lemma 3.26 as many times as the number of non-elementary quasiatoms of
E , we (with Lemma 3.12 in mind) get 〈Γ 〉 ↓ E∗ = 〈〉↓ E∗1 . But E∗1 is an elementary game, and obviously for every
elementary game A, 〈〉↓A = A. Hence,
〈Γ 〉↓E∗ = E∗1 . (24)
Assume E has m negative and n positive general quasiatoms, E-specified by δ1, . . . , δm and σ1, . . . , σn , respectively.
Let E2 be the result of replacing in E1 each atom rδi (1 ≤ i ≤ m) by>, and each atom rσi (1 ≤ i ≤ n) by⊥. Applying
Lemma 3.21 m + n times, we get
E∗2 ≤ E∗1 . (25)
Next, assume E contains k hybrid letters, whose positive occurrences are E-specified by pi1, . . . , pik , and whose
negative occurrences E-specified by ν1, . . . , νk , respectively. Let E3 be the result of replacing in E2 each letter rpii
(1 ≤ i ≤ k) by rνi . Applying Claim 1 plus Lemma 3.21 k times, we get
E∗3 ≤ E∗2 . (26)
Let q1, . . . , qk be the list of the elementary components of the hybrid letters of E whose negative occurrences are
E-specified by the above ν1, . . . , νk , respectively. Compare E3 with ‖E‖. An analysis of how these two formulas
have been obtained from E can reveal that E3 is just the result of replacing in ‖E‖ every occurrence of every letter
qi (1 ≤ i ≤ k) by rνi . That is, E3 is a substitutional instance (in the standard classical sense) of ‖E‖. The latter is
classically valid because, by our assumptions, E is stable. Hence E3 is also classically valid, and thus E∗3 is true.
Then, by (26), (25) and (24), so is 〈Γ 〉↓E∗. This means nothing but thatWnE∗〈Γ 〉 = >. 
7 Note that while in clause (2) the whole atom is replaced, in clause (3) only the letter is replaced, without affecting the attached tuple of terms
of the atom.
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4. Soundness of CL4
Lemma 4.1. If CL4 ` F, then F is valid (any formula F). Moreover, there is an effective procedure that takes a
CL4-proof of an arbitrary formula F and constructs an HPM that wins F∗ for every F-admissible interpretation ∗.
Proof. In view of Proposition 3.2 of [6], it would be sufficient to prove the above lemma – in particular, the ‘Moreover’
clause of it – with “fair EPM” instead of “HPM”. Also, 3.1 and 3.3 allow us to safely replace “CL4-proof” by
“reasonableCL4◦-proof” in our present lemma.With these remarks in mind, Lemma 4.1 is an immediate consequence
of the following Lemma 4.2. 
Lemma 4.2. There is an effective procedure that takes a reasonable CL4◦-proof of a hyperformula F and constructs
a fair EPM E such that, for every F-admissible interpretation ∗, E |H F∗.
Idea. Every reasonable CL4◦-proof, in fact, can be viewed as an interpretation-independent winning strategy for >,
and the fair EPM E that we are going to design just follows such a strategy. As we probably remember from the
soundness proof given in [6], the same was the case with CL3-proofs, where each conclusion-to-premise transition of
Rule A encoded a move by ⊥ (with all premises accounting for all possible legal moves by ⊥), and the conclusion-
to-premise transition of Rules B1 and B2 encoded the “good” move that > should make in a given situation; in either
case, after a move was made, >’s strategy would jump to the corresponding premise H , recursively calling itself on
H . In our present case this intuitive meaning of Rules A, B1 and B2 is retained. In addition, Rule C◦ signals > that
from now on it should try – using copy-cat methods – to keep identical8 the subplays/subruns in the two occurrences
of the hybrid atom introduced (in the bottom-up view) by that rule.
The overall situation with CL3, however, was much simpler than it is with CL4◦. In CL3-proof-derived strategies,
as we just noted, to every legal move in a play corresponded a transition from a given formula to one of its premises
H in the proof. This is no longer the case with CL4◦. Specifically, there is nothing in CL4◦-proofs corresponding to
moves made in non-choice quasiatoms. So, by the time when the strategy jumps to H , the game to which the original
game will have been “brought down” may be not H∗ but rather 〈Ω〉H∗, where Ω is the sequence of the moves made
by the two players in the hybrid and general quasiatoms of H . Thus, the strategy has to be successful for such 〈Ω〉H∗
rather than (as was the case with CL3-proof-derived strategies) just for H∗. Fortunately, it turns out that success in
this more complicated situation is still possible as long as Ω is H -manageable; and ensuring that Ω is indeed always
manageable also turns out to be a “manageable” task for >. This is where all of our manageability-related lemmas
from the previous section come to help.
Now a little more detailed – yet informal – description of how our strategy/machine E works for a hyperformula
F with a reasonable CL4◦-proof. For safety and without loss of generality, we can limit our considerations to perfect
interpretations and also assume that F is closed. As noted, the strategy is recursive, at every step dealing with 〈Ω〉E∗,
where E is a CL4◦-provable reasonable hyperformula and Ω is an E-manageable (legal) position of E∗. Initially
E = F and Ω = 〈〉. How E acts on 〈Ω〉E∗ depends on by which of the four rules E is derived in CL4◦.
If E is derived by Rule B1 or B2 from H , the machine – exactly as in [6] – makes the move α “prescribed” by
that application of the rule. For instance, if E = G(7) → unionsqzG(z) and H = G(7) → G(7), then ‘2.7’ is such a
move. Lemmas 3.16 and 3.17 tell us that Ω remains H -manageable and that α brings 〈Ω〉E∗ down to 〈Ω〉H∗. So,
after making move α, the machine switches to its winning strategy for 〈Ω〉H∗. This, by the induction hypothesis,
guarantees a success.
If E is derived by Rule C◦ from H through replacing the two occurrences of a hybrid letter Pq in H by P , then the
machine finds within Ω and copies, in the positive occurrence of Pq , all of the moves made so far by the environment
in the negative occurrence of Pq (or rather in the corresponding occurrence of the P-based atom), and vice versa.
This series of moves brings the game down to 〈Ω ′〉E∗ = 〈Ω ′〉H∗, where Ω ′ is the result of adding those moves to Ω .
Lemma 3.19 guarantees that Ω ′ is H -manageable. So, now the machine switches to its successful strategy for 〈Ω ′〉H∗
and eventually wins.
Finally, suppose E is derived by Rule A. Our machine keeps granting permission. Now and then the environment
will be making moves in general quasiatoms of E , to which E does not react. However, every time ⊥ makes a
8 This is generally impossible in the literal sense, but what is possible is to ensure that one play is a >-delay of the other which, taking into
account that we are talking about static games, is just as good as if the two plays were fully identical.
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move in one of the hybrid quasiatoms, E copies that move in the other same-base quasiatom. Clauses (i) and (ii)
of Lemma 3.20 guarantee that, while this is going on, (the continuously updated) Ω remains E-manageable. So,
if nothing else happens, in view of Lemma 3.15, Ω – even if it grows infinite – remains E-manageable, and then
Lemma 3.27 guarantees that the game will be won by > because, as a conclusion of Rule A, E is stable. However,
what will typically happen during this stage (except one – the last – case) is that sooner or later ⊥ makes a legal move
not in a hybrid or general quasiatom, but rather a move signifying a decision associated with a choice quasiatom of
E . E.g., if E = (Pq ∨¬Pq)∧ (G3 uG4), then ‘2.1’ can be such a move. Now the situation is very similar to the case
with Rules B1 or B2: the machine simply switches to its winning strategy for 〈Ω〉H∗, where H is the corresponding
premise of E (H = (Pq ∨ ¬Pq) ∧ G3 in our example). Clauses (iii)(2) and (iv)(2) of Lemma 3.20 guarantee that
〈Ω〉H∗ is indeed the game to which 〈Ω〉E∗ has evolved; and, according to clauses (iii)(1) and (iv)(1) of the same
lemma, Ω is H -manageable, so that, by the induction hypothesis, E knows how to win 〈Ω〉H∗.
Proof. Fix a hyperformula F together with a reasonable CL4◦-proof for it. In the present context we view such a
proof as a sequence (rather than tree) of hyperformulas. We will be referring to this sequence as “the proof”, and
referring to hyperformulas occurring in the proof as “proof hyperformulas”. We assume that there are no repetitions
or other redundancies in the proof (otherwise eliminate them), and that each proof hyperformula comes with a fixed
justification— an indication of by which rule and from what premises the hyperformula was derived.
We construct the EPM E whose work can be described as follows. At the beginning it creates three records: E to
hold a hyperformula, Ω to hold a position, and f to hold a (representation of a) finite valuation.9 E is initialized to
F , Ω initialized to 〈〉, and f initialized to {x1/c1, . . . , xs/cs}, where x1, . . . , xs are all the free variables of F and, for
each 1 ≤ i ≤ s, ci is the value assigned to xi by the valuation spelled on the valuation tape. After this initialization
step, E follows the following interactive algorithmMAIN LOOP. The description of this algorithm assumes that, at the
beginning of each iteration of MAIN LOOP or INNER LOOP, E is a proof hyperformula, and also that, for every free
variable x of E , f contains exactly one element x/c and vice versa: for every element x/c of f , x is a free variable of
E . That these conditions are always satisfied can be immediately seen from the description of the algorithm.
ProcedureMAIN LOOP: Act depending on which of the four rules was used (last) to derive E in the proof:
Case of Rule B1. Let H be the premise of E in the proof. H is the result of replacing in E a certain negative (resp.
positive) surface occurrence γ of a subhyperformula G1 u · · · u Gn (resp. G1 unionsq · · · unionsq Gn) by Gi for some
i ∈ {1, . . . , n}. Then make the move γ i ; update f by deleting in it all pairs z/c where z is not a free variable
of H ; update E to H ; repeat MAIN LOOP.
Case of Rule B2. Let H be the premise of E in the proof. H is the result of replacing in E a negative (resp. positive)
surface occurrence γ of a subhyperformulauxG(x) (resp.unionsqxG(x)) by G(t) for some term t such that t is
not bound in H . Let c = f (t).10 Then make the move γ c; if t is a free variable of H , update f to f ∪ {t/c};
update E to H ; repeat MAIN LOOP.
Case of Rule C◦. Let H be the premise of E in the proof. E is the result of replacing in H the positive surface
occurrence pi and the negative surface occurrence ν of some hybrid letter Pq by the general letter P .
Let 〈⊥pi1, . . . ,⊥pin〉 and 〈⊥ν1, . . . ,⊥νm〉 be Ωpi and Ων , respectively. Then: make the n + m moves
piν1, . . . , piνm, νpi1, . . . , νpin (in this very order); update Ω to 〈Ω ,>piν1, . . . ,>piνm,>νpi1, . . . ,>νpin〉;
update E to H ; repeat MAIN LOOP.
Case of Rule A. Follow the procedure INNER LOOP described below.
Procedure INNER LOOP: Keep granting permission until the adversary makes a move α, then act
depending on which of the following five subcases holds:
Subcase (i). α = γβ, where γ E-specifies a general quasiatom. Then update Ω to 〈Ω ,⊥γβ〉, and repeat
INNER LOOP.
9 Remember from [6] that a finite valuation f is one that sends only a finite number of variables to something other than 0. We agreed to represent
such an f as a finite set of variable/constant pairs that has to include an entry for each variable z with f (z) 6= 0, and may or may not include entries
for other variables.
10 Remember that, if t is a constant, then f (as any other valuation) sends it to itself, and if t is a variable not listed within the variable/constant
pairs of the representation of f , then f (t) = 0.
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Subcase (ii). α = γβ, where γ E-specifies a hybrid quasiatom. Let σ be the E-specification of the other
same-base hybrid quasiatom. Then make the move σβ, update Ω to 〈Ω ,⊥γβ,>σβ〉, and repeat INNER
LOOP.
Subcase (iii). α = γ i , where γ E-specifies a positive (resp. negative) quasiatom G1 u · · · u Gn (resp.
G1 unionsq · · · unionsqGn) and i ∈ {1, . . . , n}. Let H be the result of replacing in E the above quasiatom by Gi . Then
update f by deleting in it all pairs z/c where z is not a free variable of H ; update E to H ; repeat MAIN
LOOP.
Subcase (iv). α = γ c, where γ E-specifies a positive (resp. negative) quasiatomuxG(x) (resp.unionsqxG(x)).
Let H be the premise of E in the proof that is the result of replacing in E the above quasiatom by G(y)
for some variable y not occurring in E . Then, if y is a free variable of H ,11 update f to f ∪ {y/c}; update
E to H ; repeat MAIN LOOP.
Subcase (v). α does not satisfy the conditions of any of the above Subcases (i)–(iv). Then go to an infinite
loop in a permission state.
It is obvious that E can be constructed effectively from the CL4◦-proof of F . Pick an arbitrary F-admissible
interpretation ∗, an arbitrary valuation e and an arbitrary e-computation branch B of E . Fix Θ∞ as the run spelled by
B. Our goal is to show that B is fair and thatWnF
∗
e 〈Θ∞〉 = >.
Consider the work of E in B. For each k ≥ 1 such that MAIN LOOP makes at least k iterations in B, let Ek and
fk denote the values of records E and f at the beginning of the kth iteration of MAIN LOOP, and let Kk = fkEk .
Evidently Ek+1 is always one of the premises of Ek in the proof, so that MAIN LOOP is iterated only a finite number
of times. Fix l as the number of these iterations. The lth (last) iteration deals with the case of Rule A – and, besides,
never with Subcases (iii) or (iv) within it – for otherwise there would be a next iteration of MAIN LOOP. This
guarantees that E will grant permission infinitely many times during the lth iteration, so that branch B is indeed fair.
What remains to show now is thatWnF
∗
e 〈Θ∞〉 = >, i.e.Wne[F∗]〈Θ∞〉 = >. f1 agrees with e on all free variables
of F = E1. Hence, by Lemma 3.7, e[F∗] = e[( f1E1)∗] = e[K ∗1 ]. Let Ě be the perfect interpretation induced by
(∗, e). By Lemma 3.9, e[K ∗1 ] = K Ě1 . Hence e[F∗] = K Ě1 . Thus, our goal of showingWne[F
∗]〈Θ∞〉 = > now reduces
to showing WnK
Ě
1 〈Θ∞〉 = >. The latter is immediate when Θ∞ is a ⊥-illegal run of K Ě1 . Hence we exclude this
trivial case and, for the rest of this proof, assume that Θ∞ is not a ⊥-illegal run of K Ě1 . Speaking less formally, we
assume that ⊥ never makes illegal moves. Note that the K Ěi are constant games (Lemma 3.6), so we can talk about
their legal, won, etc. runs – as we just did – without mentioning e or bothering about the distinction between “legal”
and “unilegal”.
The above-observed fact that El is derived by Rule A implies that
El is stable. (27)
For each i with 1 ≤ k ≤ l, let Θk be the initial segment of Θ∞ consisting of the moves made by the beginning of
the kth iteration of MAIN LOOP. Also, for each such k, let Ωk be the value of record Ω at the beginning of the kth
iteration of MAIN LOOP.
Claim 1. For any k with 1 ≤ k ≤ l,
Ωk is Kk-manageable; (28)
〈Θk〉K Ě1 = 〈Ωk〉K Ěk . (29)
This claim can be proven by induction on k. The basis case with k = 1 is trivial as Θ1 = Ω1 = 〈〉.
Now consider an arbitrary k with 1 ≤ k < l and assume (induction hypothesis) that conditions (28) and (29) are
satisfied. Note that, by Convention 3.10, condition (29) implies Θk ∈ LRK
Ě
1 and Ωk ∈ LRK
Ě
k . Implicitly relying on
this fact, we separately consider the following four cases, depending on with which case the kth iteration of MAIN
LOOP deals. In each case we want to show that the same two conditions continue to be satisfied for k+ 1, i.e. that the
11 I.e. unless x did not really have a free occurrence in G(x).
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following statements are true:
Ωk+1 is Kk+1-manageable; (30)
〈Θk+1〉K Ě1 = 〈Ωk+1〉K Ěk+1. (31)
Case of Rule B1. Record Ω is not updated in this case, so Ωk+1 = Ωk . Also, exactly one (>-labeled) move γ i is made,
where γ is the Ek- and hence Kk-specification of a negative (resp. positive) quasiatomG1u· · ·uGn (resp.G1unionsq· · ·unionsqGn)
and i ∈ {1, . . . , n}. Thus, Θk+1 = 〈Θk,>γ i〉. Note that Kk+1 relates to Kk as H does to E in Lemma 3.16. Keeping
this in mind, with Ωk = Ωk+1 in the role of Ω (which, by our induction hypothesis, is a Kk-manageable unilegal
run of K Ěk ), we find that (30) follows from clause 1 of Lemma 3.16. According to clause 2 of the same lemma,
〈Ωk,>γ i〉K Ěk = 〈Ωk〉K Ěk+1 = 〈Ωk+1〉K Ěk+1, i.e. 〈>γ i〉〈Ωk〉K Ěk = 〈Ωk+1〉K Ěk+1. 12 But, by (29), 〈Ωk〉K Ěk = 〈Θk〉K Ě1 .
Hence, 〈>γ i〉〈Θk〉K Ě1 = 〈Ωk+1〉K Ěk+1, i.e. 〈Θk,>γ i〉K Ě1 = 〈Ωk+1〉K Ěk+1, which, as 〈Θk,>γ i〉 = Θk+1, proves (31).
Case of Rule B2. Similar to the previous one, only use Lemma 3.17 instead of Lemma 3.16.
Case of Rule C◦.With Ek in the role of E , let H , pi , ν, pi1, . . . , pin , ν1, . . . , νm be as in the description of the ‘Case
of Rule C◦’ clause of MAIN LOOP. Note that Ek+1 = H and
Ωk+1 = 〈Ωk,>piν1, . . . ,>piνm,>νpi1, . . . ,>νpin〉.
Now, with Ωk in the role of Ω , Kk in the role of E and Kk+1 in the role of H , the conditions of Lemma 3.19 are
satisfied. Then, by that lemma, Ωk+1 is a Kk+1-manageable (uni)legal position of K Ěk+1, which proves (30) and also
ensures that 〈Ωk+1〉K Ěk+1 is defined. The latter can be rewritten as
〈>piν1, . . . ,>piνm,>νpi1, . . . ,>νpin〉〈Ωk〉K Ěk+1.
By (29), 〈Ωk〉K Ěk = 〈Θk〉K Ě1 . Also notice that K Ěk+1 = K Ěk , so 〈Ωk〉K Ěk+1 = 〈Θk〉K Ě1 . Hence 〈Ωk+1〉K Ěk+1 =
〈>piν1, . . . ,>piνm,>νpi1, . . . ,>νpin〉〈Θk〉K Ě1 . This means that
〈Ωk+1〉K Ěk+1 = 〈Θk,>piν1, . . . ,>piνm,>νpi1, . . . ,>νpin〉K Ě1 .
But Θk+1 = 〈Θk,>piν1, . . . ,>piνm,>νpi1, . . . ,>νpin〉. Hence 〈Ωk+1〉K Ěk+1 = 〈Θk+1〉K Ě1 . This proves (31).
Case of Rule A. The work of the machine during this (kth) iteration of MAIN LOOP consists of iterating INNER
LOOP a finite number lk of times (otherwise we would have k = l). Fix this lk . For each m with 1 ≤ m ≤ lk , let Θk,m
be the initial segment of Θ∞ consisting of the moves made by the beginning of the mth iteration of INNER LOOP
within the kth iteration of MAIN LOOP. Similarly, for each such m, let Ωk,m be the value of record Ω at the beginning
of the mth iteration of INNER LOOP within the kth iteration of MAIN LOOP.
Subclaim 1.1. For any m with 1 ≤ m ≤ lk ,
Ωk,m is Kk-manageable; (32)
〈Θk,m〉K Ě1 = 〈Ωk,m〉K Ěk . (33)
We prove the above by induction on m. The basis with m = 1 is straightforward: we have Θk,1 = Θk and Ωk,1 = Ωk ,
so this case is nothing but the induction hypothesis of the induction on k in our proof of Claim 1, i.e. statements (28)
and (29).
Now consider any m with 1 ≤ m < lk , and assume (32) and (33) are true (induction hypothesis). Let us take a note
that, by (33) and Convention 3.10, we have Θk,m ∈ LRK
Ě
1 and Ωk,m ∈ LRK
Ě
k . We want to show that the following
12 Here and very often later we implicitly rely on the fact that, for any game A and positions Ψ1 and Ψ2, the conditions “〈Ψ1,Ψ2〉 ∈ LRA”
and “Ψ1 ∈ LRA and 〈Ψ2〉 ∈ LR〈Ψ1〉A” are equivalent and, whenever they are satisfied, we have 〈Ψ1,Ψ2〉A = 〈Ψ2〉〈Ψ1〉A (where 〈Ψ2〉〈Ψ1〉A
should be read as 〈Ψ2〉(〈Ψ1〉A)). An official proof of this easy-to-understand phenomenon is given in [4], Lemma 3.4.
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conditions are also satisfied:
Ωk,m+1 is Kk-manageable; (34)
〈Θk,m+1〉K Ě1 = 〈Ωk,m+1〉K Ěk . (35)
At the beginning of the mth iteration of INNER LOOP, the machine is waiting for the adversary to make a move
α. Such a move must be made because k is not the last iteration of MAIN LOOP. By our assumption that ⊥ never
makes illegal moves, 〈Θk,m,⊥α〉 must be a legal position of K Ě1 , whence 〈⊥α〉 ∈ LR〈Θk,m 〉K
Ě
1 , whence, by (33),
〈⊥α〉 ∈ LR〈Ωk,m 〉K Ěk , whence 〈Ωk,m,⊥α〉 ∈ LRK
Ě
k . This means that α, Kk (in the role of E) and Ωk,m (in the role of
Ω ) satisfy the conditions of Lemma 3.20. Then, in view of that lemma, it is obvious that α – now with Ek in the role
of E – should satisfy the conditions of one of the Subcases (i), (ii), (iii) or (iv) from the description of INNER LOOP.
Subcases (iii) and (iv) are impossible because then we would have m = lk . Thus, either Subcase (i) or Subcase (ii)
should be satisfied.
Suppose Subcase (i) is satisfied, with α = γβ as described in that subcase. Then Ωk,m+1 = 〈Ωk,m,⊥γβ〉,
and (34) holds by clause (i) of Lemma 3.20, which also asserts that 〈Ωk,m,⊥γβ〉 ∈ LRK
Ě
k . According to (33),
〈Ωk,m〉K Ěk = 〈Θk,m〉K Ě1 , and hence 〈Ωk,m,⊥γβ〉K Ěk = 〈Θk,m,⊥γβ〉K Ě1 , i.e. 〈Ωk,m+1〉K Ěk = 〈Θk,m,⊥γβ〉K Ě1 . But in
our case Θk,m+1 = 〈Θk,m,⊥γβ〉. Therefore, 〈Θk,m+1〉K Ě1 = 〈Ωk,m+1〉K Ěk . This proves (35).
Suppose now Subcase (ii) is satisfied, with α = γβ and σ as described in that subcase. Then Ωk,m+1 =
〈Ωk,m,⊥γβ,>σβ〉. Now, (34) follows from clause (ii) of Lemma 3.20, which also asserts that 〈Ωk,m,⊥γβ,>σβ〉 is
in LRK
Ě
k . And, taking into account thatΘk,m+1 = 〈Θk,m,⊥γβ,>σβ〉, (35) follows from (33). Subclaim 1.1 is proven.
Back to the ‘Case of RuleA’ step of our proof of Claim 1. Consider the lk th (last) iteration of INNER LOOP within
the kth iteration of MAIN LOOP. Since k < l, obviously this iteration deals with one of the Subcases (iii) or (iv). Let
α and H be as in the description of Subcase (iii) (resp. (iv)). Note that Ek+1 = H and Ωk+1 = Ωk,lk . For the same
reasons as in the proof of Subclaim 1.1 (with lk in the role of m), 〈Ωk,lk ,⊥α〉 is a legal position of K Ěk . According to
Subclaim 1.1, we have:
Ωk,lk is Kk-manageable; (36)
〈Θk,lk 〉K Ě1 = 〈Ωk,lk 〉K Ěk . (37)
Statement (30) follows from (36) by clause (iii)(1) (resp. (iv)(1)) of Lemma 3.20. According to clause (iii)(2) (resp.
(iv)(2)) of the same lemma, 〈Ωk,lk ,⊥α〉K Ěk = 〈Ωk,lk 〉K Ěk+1 and hence 〈Ωk,lk ,⊥α〉K Ěk = 〈Ωk+1〉K Ěk+1. This, in turn,
implies 〈⊥α〉〈Ωk,lk 〉K Ěk = 〈Ωk+1〉K Ěk+1. By (37), 〈Ωk,lk 〉K Ěk = 〈Θk,lk 〉K Ě1 . Hence 〈⊥α〉〈Θk,lk 〉K Ě1 = 〈Ωk+1〉K Ěk+1 and
thus 〈Θk,lk ,⊥α〉K Ě1 = 〈Ωk+1〉K Ěk+1. But observe that 〈Θk,lk ,⊥α〉 = Θk+1. Therefore (31) holds. Claim 1 is proven.
We continue our proof of Lemma 4.2. Consider the last (lth) iteration of MAIN LOOP. As we noted earlier when
deriving (27), this iteration deals with the case of Rule A. Let N be {1, . . . , k} if k is the number of iterations of IN-
NER LOOP within the lth iteration of MAIN LOOP, and be {1, 2, 3, . . .} if there are infinitely many such iterations.
For each m ∈ N , as before, let Θl,m be the initial segment of Θ∞ consisting of the moves made by the beginning of
the mth iteration of INNER LOOP within the lth iteration of MAIN LOOP, and let Ωl,m be the value of record Ω at
the beginning of the mth iteration of INNER LOOP within the lth iteration of MAIN LOOP. For the same reasons13
as in the proof of (32) and (33) (where from (33) we only need its implicit statement that Ωk,m ∈ LRK
Ě
k ), we have:
For any m ∈ N , Ωl,m is a Kl -manageable legal position of K Ěl . (38)
Note that, during the work of E , every update of record Ω extends its previous value by adding new labmoves to it,
without ever deleting old labmoves. So, let Ω∞ be the “ultimate” value of Ω , precisely meaning the shortest run such
that, for every m ∈ N , Ωl,m is an initial segment of Ω∞ . Of course, if N = {1, . . . , k}, then Ω∞ is simply Ωl,k .
13 With the minor difference that now the reason why Subcases (iii) and (iv) are impossible is that otherwise l would not be the last iteration of
MAIN LOOP.
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Statement (38) – together with Lemma 3.15 when Ω∞ is infinite – implies that Ω∞ is a Kl -manageable legal run of
K Ěl . Therefore, by (27) and Lemma 3.27, we have
WnK
Ě
l 〈Ω∞〉 = >. (39)
Ω∞ is an extension of Ωl , so that Ω∞ = 〈Ωl ,∆〉 for some run ∆. Let us fix this ∆. Now (39) can be rewritten
as WnK
Ě
l 〈Ωl ,∆〉 = >. In turn, the latter – remembering the definition of the operation of prefixation and tak-
ing into account that, by (29), Ωl ∈ LRK
Ě
l – can be rewritten as Wn〈Ωl 〉K
Ě
l 〈∆〉 = >. Now, according to Claim 1,
〈Ωl〉K Ěl = 〈Θl〉K Ě1 . Thus,Wn〈Θl 〉K
Ě
1 〈∆〉 = >, which can be rewritten back as
WnK
Ě
1 〈Θl ,∆〉 = >. (40)
For the same reasons14 as in our proof of Subclaim 1.1, iterations of INNER LOOP within the lth iteration of MAIN
LOOP never deal with Subcases (iii), (iv) or (v) of ‘Case of Rule A’. The remaining Subcases (i) and (ii) add to record
Ω all of the moves made by the players (and no other moves, of course). Therefore, taking into account that the value
of that record is Ωl when the lth iteration of MAIN LOOP starts, we can see that∆ is nothing but exactly the sequence
of all moves made during the lth iteration of MAIN LOOP. Hence Θ∞ = 〈Θl ,∆〉. Thus, by (40), WnK
Ě
1 〈Θ∞〉 = >,
and our proof of Lemma 4.2 is complete. 
5. Completeness of CL4
Lemma 5.1. If CL4 6` F, then F is not valid (any formula F). Moreover, if CL4 6` F, then F∗ is not computable for
some F-admissible interpretation ∗ that interprets elementary letters as finitary predicates of arithmetical complexity
∆2, and interprets general letters as problems of the form (A11 unionsq · · · unionsq A1m)u · · · u (A1m unionsq · · · unionsq Amm), where each A ji is
a finitary predicate of arithmetical complexity ∆2.
Idea. The reader may want to start by trying the following Exercise: Verify that P → P ∧ P is not valid. Hint: Show
that CL3 6` (p1 u p2) → (p1 u p2) ∧ (p1 u p2), then remember the completeness theorem for CL3.
The above hint provides insights into the basic idea underlying our proof of Lemma 5.1. We are going to
show that, whenever CL4 6` F , there is a CL3-formula dFe of the same form as F that is not provable in
CL3; this, in view of the already known completeness of CL3, immediately yields non-validity for F . Precisely,
“the same form as F” will mean that dFe is the result of rewriting in F every n-ary general atom P(Et) as(
Pˇ11 (Et) unionsq · · · unionsq Pˇ1m(Et)
) u · · · u (Pˇm1 (Et) unionsq · · · unionsq Pˇmm (Et)), where m is a “sufficiently big” number and the Pˇ ij are arbitrary
“neutral” (not occurring in F and pairwise distinct) n-ary elementary letters. Let us call the above long formula a
molecule and say that the general letter P is its base.
Intuitively, the reason why CL3 6` dFe, i.e. why > cannot win (the game represented by) dFe, is that a smart
environment may start choosing different conjuncts/disjuncts in different occurrences of molecules. The best that >
can do in such a play is to match any given positive or negative occurrence of a molecule with one (but not more!)
negative or positive occurrence of a same-base molecule — match in the sense that mimic environment’s moves in
order to keep the subgames/subformulas at the two occurrences identical. Yet, this is not sufficient for > to achieve a
guaranteed success. This is so because >’s decisions about what pairs of molecules to match in dFe can be modeled
by appropriate applications of Rule C in an attempted CL4-proof of F , and so can be – through Rules A, B1 and
B2 – either player’s decisions required by the choice operators in the non-molecule parts of dFe. A winning strategy
(CL3-proof) for dFe would then translate into a CL4-proof for F , which, however, does not exist.
Proof. Fix a CL4-formula F . Let P be the set of all general letters occurring in F . Let us fix m as the total number
of occurrences of such letters in F15; if there are fewer than 2 of such occurrences, then we take m = 2. For the rest
of this section, let us agree that
a, b always range over {1, . . . ,m}.
14 Again, with the minor difference pointed out in the previous footnote.
15 In fact, a much smaller m would be sufficient for our purposes. E.g., m can be chosen to be such that no given general letter has more than m
occurrences in F . But why try to economize.
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Let us pick some pool z1, z2, . . . of variables not occurring in F . For each n-ary P ∈ P and each a, b, with Ez
abbreviating z1, . . . , zn , we fix the atom
• Pˇab (Ez),
where Pˇab is an n-ary non-logical elementary letter not occurring in F . We assume that Pˇ
a
b 6= Qˇcd as long as either
P 6= Q or a 6= c or b 6= d . Note that the Pˇab are elementary letters despite our “tradition” according to which the
capital letters P, Q, . . . stand for general letters.
Next, for each n-ary P ∈ P and each a, we define
• Pˇaunionsq (Ez) = Pˇa1 (Ez) unionsq · · · unionsq Pˇam(Ez).
Finally, for each n-ary P ∈ P , we define
• Pˇuunionsq (Ez) = Pˇ1unionsq (Ez) u · · · u Pˇmunionsq (Ez) =
(
Pˇ11 (Ez) unionsq · · · unionsq Pˇ1m(Ez)
) u · · · u (Pˇm1 (Ez) unionsq · · · unionsq Pˇmm (Ez)).
For an n-ary P ∈ P and an n-tuple Et of terms, we refer to the formulas Pˇab (Et), Pˇaunionsq (Et) and Pˇuunionsq (Et) as molecules, in
particular, P(Et)-based molecules, where “(Et)” can be omitted when there is no need to indicate this parameter. We
can also more specifically refer to Pˇab (Et) as a16 Pˇab -molecule, refer to Pˇaunionsq (Et) as a Pˇaunionsq -molecule, and refer to Pˇuunionsq (Et) as
a Pˇuunionsq -molecule. To differentiate between the three sorts of molecules, we call the molecules of the type Pˇab (Et) small,
call the molecules of the type Pˇaunionsq (Et) medium, and call the molecules of the type Pˇuunionsq (Et) large.
For simplicity, for the rest of this section we assume/pretend that the languages of CL3 and CL4 have no non-
logical letters other than those occurring in F plus the letters Pˇab (P ∈ P , a, b ∈ {1, . . . ,m}). This way the scopes of
the terms “CL4-formula” and “CL3-formula” are correspondingly redefined.
Let us say that an occurrence of a molecule in a given CL3-formula is independent iff it is not a part of another
(“larger”) molecule. E.g., the occurrence of Pˇab (Et) in Pˇab (Et) → ⊥ is independent, while in Pˇaunionsq (Et) → ⊥, i.e. in
Pˇa1 (Et)unionsq · · · unionsq Pˇab (Et)unionsq · · · unionsq Pˇam(Et) →⊥, it is not. Of course, surface occurrences of molecules are always independent,
and so are any – surface or non-surface – occurrences of large molecules.
We say that a CL3-formula E is good iff the following conditions are satisfied:
Cond1: E contains at most m independent occurrences of molecules.
Cond2: Only large molecules (may) have independent non-surface occurrences in E .
Cond3: For each a and b, E has at most one positive independent occurrence of a Pˇab -molecule and at most one
negative independent occurrence of a Pˇab -molecule.
Cond4: For each a, E has at most one positive independent occurrence of a Pˇaunionsq -molecule, and when E has such an
occurrence, then for no b does E have a positive independent occurrence of a Pˇab -molecule.
Let E be a CL3-formula. By an isolated small molecule of E (or E-isolated small molecule, or a small molecule
isolated in E) we will mean a Pˇab -molecule that has an independent occurrence in E , such that E contains no other
independent occurrences of Pˇab -molecules. We will say that such a molecule is positive or negative depending on
whether its independent occurrence in E is positive or negative. Next, the floorification of E , denoted by
bEc,
is the result of replacing in E every independent occurrence of every P(Et)-based large, medium and E-isolated small
molecule by the general atom P(Et).
Claim 1. For any good CL3-formula E, if CL3 ` E, then CL4 ` bEc.
To prove this claim, assume E is good and CL3 ` E . By induction on the length of the CL3-proof of E , we want
to show that CL4 ` bEc. We need to consider the following three cases, depending on which of the three rules of
CL3 was used (last) to derive E .
16 We say “a” rather than “the” here because, while P , a and b are fixed, Et may vary.
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CASE 1: E is derived by Rule A. Let us fix the set EH of premises of E . Each element of EH is provable in CL3.
Hence, by the induction hypothesis, we have:
For any H ∈ EH, if H is good, then CL4 ` bHc. (41)
We consider the following 3 subcases. The first two subcases are not mutually exclusive, and either can be chosen when
both apply. Specifically, Subcase 1.1 (resp. 1.2) is about when E has a positive (resp. negative) surface occurrence
of a large (resp. medium) molecule. Then, as we are going to see, replacing that molecule by a “safe” conjunct
(resp. disjunct), corresponding to a smart environment’s possible move, yields a good formula H from EH such that
bEc = bHc which, by (41), automatically means the CL4-provability of bEc. The remaining Subcase 1.3 is about
when all surface occurrences of large (resp. medium) molecules in E are negative (resp. positive). This will be shown
to imply that bEc follows from the floorifications of some elements of EH by Rule A for “the same reasons as” E
follows from EH .
Subcase 1.1: E has a positive surface occurrence of a large molecule Pˇuunionsq (Et). Pick any a such that neither any Pˇaunionsq -
molecule nor any Pˇba -molecule (whatever b) have independent occurrences in E . Such an a exists, for otherwise we
would have at least m + 1 independent occurrences of molecules in E (including the occurrence of Pˇuunionsq (Et)), which
contradicts Cond1. Let H be the result of replacing in E the above occurrence of Pˇuunionsq (Et) by Pˇaunionsq (Et). Clearly H ∈ EH .
Observe that when transferring from E to H , we just “downsize” Pˇuunionsq (Et) and otherwise do not create any additional
independent occurrences of molecules, so Cond1 continues to be satisfied for H . Neither do we introduce any new
non-surface occurrences of molecules or any new independent occurrences of small molecules, so Cond2 and Cond3
also continue to hold for H . And our choice of a obviously guarantees that so does Cond4. To summarize, H is
good. Therefore, by (41), CL4 ` bHc. Finally, note that, when floorifying a given formula, both Pˇuunionsq (Et) and Pˇaunionsq (Et)
get replaced by the same atom P(Et); and, as the only difference between E and H is that H has Pˇaunionsq (Et) where E has
Pˇuunionsq (Et), obviously bHc = bEc. Thus, CL4 ` bEc.
Subcase 1.2: E has a negative surface occurrence of a medium molecule Pˇaunionsq (Et). Pick any b such that E does not
have an independent occurrence of any Pˇab -molecule. Again, in view of Cond1, such a b exists. Let H be the result
of replacing in E the above occurrence of Pˇaunionsq (Et) by Pˇab (Et). Certainly H ∈ EH . Conditions Cond1 and Cond2 continue
to hold for H for the same reasons as in Subcase 1.1. In view of our choice of b, Cond3 is also inherited by H from
E . And so is Cond4, because H has the same positive occurrences of (the same) molecules as E does. Thus, H is
good. Therefore, by (41), CL4 ` bHc. It remains to show that bHc = bEc. Note that when floorifying E , Pˇaunionsq (Et)
gets replaced by P(Et). But so does Pˇab (Et) when floorifying H because, by our choice of b, Pˇab (Et) is an isolated small
molecule of H . Since the only difference between H and E is that H has Pˇab (Et) where E has Pˇaunionsq (Et), it is obvious that
indeed bHc = bEc.
Subcase 1.3: Neither of the above two conditions is satisfied. This means that in E all surface occurrences of
large molecules are negative, and all surface occurrences of medium molecules are positive. Every large molecule
Pˇuunionsq (Et) is a u-formula whose surface occurrences, as we remember, get replaced by > when transferring from E to
‖E‖; but the same happens to the corresponding occurrences of P(Et) in bEc when transferring from bEc to ‖bEc‖
because, as we have just noted, such occurrences are negative, and negative surface occurrences of general atoms get
replaced by> when elementarizing CL4-formulas. Similarly, every medium molecule Pˇaunionsq (Et) is a unionsq-formula so that its
surface occurrences get replaced by ⊥ when transferring from E to ‖E‖; but the same happens to the corresponding
occurrences of P(Et) in bEc when transferring from bEc to ‖bEc‖ because they are positive, and positive surface
occurrences of general atoms get replaced by ⊥ when elementarizing CL4-formulas. Based on these observations,
with a little thought we can see that ‖bEc‖ is “almost the same” as ‖E‖; specifically, the only difference between
these two formulas is that ‖bEc‖ has ⊥ where ‖E‖ has positive isolated (isolated in E and hence in ‖E‖) small
molecules, and ‖bEc‖ has > where ‖E‖ has negative isolated small molecules. So, ‖bEc‖ is the result of replacing in
‖E‖ isolated molecules by ⊥ or >. Keeping this in mind, remember from classical logic – as we once already did in
the proof of Lemma 3.2 – that replacing an isolated atom (an atom p(Et) such that letter p has no other occurrences in
the formula) by whatever formula preserves validity. Thus, if ‖E‖ is classically valid, so is ‖bEc‖. But ‖E‖ indeed is
classically valid because E is derived by Rule A. We conclude that
bEc is stable. (42)
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Subclaim 1.1.
(i) Whenever bEc has a positive (resp. negative) quasiatom K of the form G1 u · · · u Gn (resp. G1 unionsq · · · unionsq Gn), for
each i ∈ {1, . . . , n}, there is a good formula H in EH such that bHc is the result of replacing K by Gi in bEc.
(ii) Whenever bEc has a positive (resp. negative) quasiatom K of the formuxG(x) (resp.unionsqxG(x)), there is a good
formula H in EH such that bHc is the result of replacing K by G(y) in bEc, where y is a variable not occurring
in bEc.
For clause (i) of the subclaim, assume bEc has a positive (resp. negative) quasiatom K = G1 u · · · u Gn (resp.
K = G1 unionsq · · · unionsq Gn), and consider any i ∈ {1, . . . , n}. The logical structure of E is the same as that of bEc, with the
only difference that, wherever bEc has general atoms, E has molecules. Hence, where bEc has the above K , E has
a positive (resp. negative) occurrence of a quasiatom K ′ = G ′1 u · · · u G ′n (resp. K ′ = G ′1 unionsq · · · unionsq G ′n). Then, since
E is derived from EH by Rule A, EH contains the result H (fix it) of replacing K ′ by G ′i in E . It is not hard to see thatbHc is the result of replacing K by Gi in bEc. What remains to show now is that H is good. When transferring from
E to H , Cond1 is inherited by H for the same reason as in all of the previous cases. So is Cond2 because we are not
creating any new non-surface occurrences. Furthermore, since K ′ is not a molecule (for otherwise bEc would have
a general atom instead of K ), Cond2 guarantees that G ′i is not a small or medium molecule. This means that, when
transferring from E to H , we are not creating new (nor destroying old) independent/surface occurrences of any small
or medium molecules, so that Cond3 and Cond4 are also inherited by H from E . To summarize, H is indeed good,
and clause (i) of Subclaim 1.1 is thus proven. Clause (ii) can be handled in a similar way.
Now (42), (41) and Subclaim 1.1 immediately imply that bEc is derivable in CL4 by Rule A. We are done with
Subcase 1.3 and hence CASE 1.
The remaining two CASES 2 and 3 are about when E is derived by one of the Rules B1 or B2 from a premise H .
Such a H turns out to be good and hence (by the induction hypothesis) its floorification CL4-provable. And, “almost
always” bEc follows from bHc by B1 or B2 for the same reasons as E follows from H . An exception is when H is
the result of replacing in E a positive occurrence of a medium molecule Pˇaunionsq (Et) by one of its disjuncts Pˇab (Et) (so that
we are talking about an application of Rule B1) such that E has a negative independent occurrence of a Pˇab -molecule.
Using our earlier terms, this is a step signifying >’s (final) decision to “match” the two P-based molecules. In this
case, while bEc does not follow from bHc by Rule B1, it does so by Rule C. The secret is that the two P-based
molecules are non-isolated small molecules in H and hence remain elementary atoms in bHc, while they turn into
general atoms in bEc.
CASE 2: E is derived by Rule B1. That is, we have CL3 ` H , where H is the result of replacing in E a negative
(resp. positive) quasiatom K of the form G1 u · · · uGn (resp. G1 unionsq · · · unionsqGn) by Gi for some i ∈ {1, . . . , n}. Fix these
formulas and this number i . Just as in CASE 1 (statement (41)), based on the induction hypothesis, we have:
If H is good, then CL4 ` bHc. (43)
We need to consider the following three subcases that cover all possibilities:
Subcase 2.1: K is not a molecule. Reasoning (almost) exactly as we did in the proof of Subclaim 1.1(i), we find
that H is good. Therefore, by (43), CL4 ` bHc. Now, a little thought can convince us that bEc follows from bHc by
Rule B1, so that CL4 ` bEc.
Subcase 2.2: K is a large molecule Pˇuunionsq (Et). So, K is negative in E , and Gi = Pˇ iunionsq(Et). A (now already routine for
us) examination of Cond1-Cond4 reveals that each of these four conditions are inherited by H from E , so that H is
good. Therefore, by (43), CL4 ` bHc. Now, bHc can be easily seen to be the same as bEc, and thus CL4 ` bEc.
Subcase 2.3: K is a medium molecule Pˇaunionsq (Et). So, K is positive in E , and Gi = Pˇai (Et). There are two subsubcases
to consider:
Subsubcase 2.3.1: E contains no independent occurrence of a Pˇai -molecule. One can easily verify that H is good
and that bHc = bEc. By (43), we then get the desired CL4 ` bEc.
Subsubcase 2.3.2: E has an independent occurrence of a Pˇai -molecule Pˇ
a
i (
Et ′). Since E also has a positive
independent occurrence of Pˇaunionsq (Et), Cond4 implies that the above occurrence of Pˇai (Et ′) in E is negative. This, in
conjunction with Cond3, means that E does not have any other independent occurrences of Pˇai -molecules, and thus
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H has exactly two – one negative and one positive – independent occurrences of Pˇai -molecules. This guarantees that
Cond3 is satisfied for H , because H and E only differ in that H has Pˇai (Et)where E has Pˇaunionsq (Et). ConditionsCond1 and
Cond2 are straightforwardly inherited by H from E . Finally, Cond4 also transfers from E to H because, even though
H – unlike E – has a positive independent occurrence of a Pˇai -molecule, it no longer has a positive independent
occurrence of a Pˇaunionsq -molecule (which, by the same condition Cond4 for E , was unique in E). Thus, H is good and,
by (43), CL4 ` bHc. Note that since H is good, by Cond2, the independent occurrences of Pˇai (Et ′) and Pˇai (Et) in it
are surface occurrences. The same, of course, is true for the corresponding occurrences of Pˇai (Et ′) and Pˇaunionsq (Et) in E .
Let us now compare bEc with bHc. According to our earlier observation, there is only one independent occurrence
of a Pˇai -molecule – specifically, Pˇ
a
i (
Et ′) – in E , i.e. Pˇai (Et ′) is E-isolated. Hence, when floorifying E , the independent
occurrence of Pˇai (Et ′) gets replaced by P(Et ′) and the independent occurrence of Pˇaunionsq (Et) replaced by P(Et). On the other
hand, Pˇai (Et ′) is no longer isolated in H , so Pˇai (Et ′) stays as it is when floorifying H ; so does Pˇai (Et) because it is not
isolated in H , either. Based on this observation, we can easily see that the only difference between bEc and bHc is
that bEc has P(Et) and P(Et ′) where bHc has Pˇai (Et) and Pˇai (Et ′). Since bEc does not contain Pˇai (because the only
independent occurrence of a Pˇai -molecule got replaced by a general atom when floorifying E), and since we deal with
two – one positive and one negative – surface occurrences of P-based general atoms in bEc, we find that bEc follows
from bHc by Rule C. We already know that CL4 ` bHc. Hence CL4 ` bEc.
CASE 3: E is derived by Rule B2. That is, we have CL3 ` H , where H is the result of replacing in E a negative
(resp. positive) quasiatom K of the form uxG(x) (resp. unionsqxG(x)) by G(t), with t not being bound in H . This case
is similar to CASE 2, but is, in fact, much simpler as K cannot be a molecule, so we only deal with a situation
corresponding to Subcase 2.1 of the previous case. The induction hypothesis, as before, implies statement (43). A
routine examination of Cond1–Cond4 reveals that these conditions are inherited by H from E , so that, by (43),
CL4 ` bHc. Now, bEc can be easily seen to follow from bHc by Rule B2, so that CL4 ` bEc.
Claim 1 is proven.
Now we are close to finishing our proof of Lemma 5.1. Assume CL4 6` F . Let dFe be the result of replacing in
F all occurrences of each (n-ary) general atom P(t1, . . . , tn) by Pˇuunionsq (t1, . . . , tn). Obviously dFe is good. Clearly we
also have bdFec = F , so that CL4 6` bdFec. Therefore, by Claim 1, CL3 6` dFe. Hence, by Theorem 5.9(b) of [6],
there is an dFe-admissible interpretation Ď that interprets every elementary letter as a finitary predicate of arithmetical
complexity ∆2, such that
6|H dFeĎ. (44)
Since Ď interprets all letters of dFe as finitary predicates, we may assume that none of those predicates depend
on any of the variables from our earlier-fixed pool z1, z2, . . . (otherwise, take any other variables instead). Let ∗ be
the interpretation17 that agrees with Ď on all elementary letters, and interprets each n-ary general letter P ∈ P as
P∗(z1, . . . , zn) defined by
P∗(z1, . . . , zn) =
(
Pˇuunionsq (z1, . . . , zn)
)Ď
.
Thus, ∗ interprets letters as promised in Lemma 5.1. To complete our proof, it remains to show that ∗ is F-admissible
and 6|H F∗. In showing admissibility, we only need to care about general letters, because elementary letters are taken
care of by the fact that on them ∗ agrees with the dFe-admissible Ď.
Consider any general atom P(t1, . . . , tn) = P(Et) of F . Based on the dFe-admissibility of Ď and our assumption
that the variables Ez = z1, . . . , zn are sufficiently “neutral”, the following two statements can be verified by a routine
analysis of the relevant definitions:
P∗(Ez) does not depend on any variables that are not among Ez but occur in F; (45)
P∗(Et) = (Pˇuunionsq (Et))Ď. (46)
17 For full accuracy, we should have said “an interpretation” here, because – out of laziness – we are not defining ∗ for general letters not occurring
in F . Earlier in this section we agreed to pretend that those letters simply do not exist. Such letters are indeed irrelevant and, if there was any need,
our ∗ could be extended to them in an arbitrary way.
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By (45), condition (i) of Definition 2.1 is satisfied. Next, as pointed out in [6], for every CL3-formula E and
interpretation Ě, the game EĚ is unistructural. So P∗, which is
(
Pˇuunionsq (z1, . . . , zn)
)Ď, is unistructural and hence, of course,
unistructural in all variables. This means that condition (ii) of Definition 2.1 is also satisfied, and we conclude that ∗
is F-admissible.
Finally, based on (46), we immediately find that F∗ = dFeĎ. This, by (44), implies 6|H F∗. 
6. Decidability of the ∀, ∃-free fragment of CL4
This section is devoted to a proof of Theorem 2.5. Here we let F range over CL4-formulas not containing blind
quantifiers. The decidability of the question CL4 ` F can be shown by induction on the aggregate complexity of F ,
by which we mean the number of occurrences of logical operators plus the number of occurrences of general atoms
in F .
F is provable iff it is derivable from some provable formulas by one of the Rules A, B1, B2 or C. Our decision
procedure is a recursive one that tests, in turn, each of these four possibilities. If one of those four tests succeeds, the
procedure returns “yes”, otherwise returns “no”.
Testing Rules A, B1 and B2: These three tests are done in the same way as described in Section 10 of [6] for
the ∀,∃-free fragment of CL3, and there is no need to (almost) literally reproduce that description here. The fact
that we deal with the more expressive language of CL4 hardly creates any differences: the question of stability of a
∀,∃-free formula still remains decidable, and Lemma 9.1 of [6] on which some of our old arguments relied is true for
CL4-formulas for virtually the same reasons as it was true for CL3-formulas.
Testing Rule C: For each pair consisting of one positive and one negative surface occurrence of some n-ary general
letter P in F , do the following: pick an arbitrary (say, the lexicographically smallest) n-ary non-logical elementary
letter q not occurring in F , replace in F the above two occurrences of P by q, and see if the resulting formula H is
CL4-provable. The aggregate complexity of H is lower than that of F , so, by the induction hypothesis, testing H for
CL4-provability can be done effectively. Also, there is only a finite number of such Hs to test. This is so because F
only has finitely many (pairs of occurrences of) general atoms P , and the above selection of a particular q is clearly
irrelevant: the outcome would be the same if any other – not occurring in F – n-ary non-logical elementary letter q ′
was selected, for there would be virtually no reason why a formula would be provable with q but not with q ′. So,
the whole procedure takes a finite amount of time. If one of the above Hs turns out to be CL4-provable, the step is
considered to have succeeded. Otherwise it has failed. Of course our test is correct: it succeeds if and only if F is
derivable by Rule C.
As an aside, an analysis the above construction can easily convince us that:
Fact 6.1. Our decision algorithm for the ∀,∃-free fragment of CL4 runs in polynomial space.
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Appendix A. Proof of Fact 2.2
Consider a CL4-formula F and an F-admissible interpretation ∗. We want to see that the game F∗ is defined,
which can be done by induction on the complexity of F . The basis case of induction is trivial. And the only non-trivial
case in the inductive step is when the main operator of F is a blind quantifier. This is so because all operations except
blind quantification are defined for all problems. So, assume F is ∀yG or ∃yG where, by the induction hypothesis,
the game G∗ is defined. Then F∗ is defined iff G∗ is unistructural in y. In order to show that G∗ is y-unistructural, it
would suffice to verify that, for every atom E of G, E∗ is y-unistructural. This is so because, according to Theorem
14.1 of [2], each of the operations ¬,∧,∨,u,unionsq,∀,∃,u,unionsq preserves the y-unistructural property.
Pick any atom E of G. If E is an elementary atom, then E∗, as an elementary game, is simply unistructural and
hence y-unistructural. Now, for the rest of this proof, suppose E is an (n-ary) general atom P(t1, . . . , tn), with P
interpreted as P∗(x1, . . . , xn). Our goal is to show that P∗(t1, . . . , tn) is y-unistructural.
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Without loss of generality, we may assume that, for some i (fix it) with 0 ≤ i ≤ n, we have t1 = · · · = ti = y and
y 6∈ {ti+1, . . . , tn}. Then, by clause (ii) of Definition 2.1,
P∗(x1, . . . , xn) is unistructural in each of the variables x1, . . . , xi . (47)
Consider any two valuations e1 and e2 that agree on all variables but y. We want to verify that
Lre1[P∗(t1,...,tn)] = Lre2[P∗(t1,...,tn)]. (48)
Let e′1 (resp. e′2) be the valuation that agrees with e1 (resp. e2) on all variables that are not among x1, . . . , xn , and
sends each x j (1 ≤ j ≤ n) to e1(t j ) (resp. e2(t j )). By Definition 4.1 of [6],
e1[P∗(t1, . . . , tn)] = e′1[P∗(x1, . . . , xn)] and e2[P∗(t1, . . . , tn)] = e′2[P∗(x1, . . . , xn)]. (49)
Claim 1. All variables on which e′1 and e′2 may disagree are among {x1, . . . , xi , y}; besides, if e′1 and e′2 (really)
disagree on y, then P∗(x1, . . . , xn) is unistructural in y.
To verify this claim, consider any variable z on which e′1 and e′2 disagree. By our assumption, each t j with i < j ≤ n
is different from y, so e1(t j ) = e2(t j ) and hence e′1(x j ) = e′2(x j ). This means that z – on which e′1 and e′2 disagree –
cannot be in {xi+1, . . . , xn}. So, if z ∈ {x1, . . . , xn}, then z must be in {x1, . . . , xi }. And, if here z = y, then, by (47),
P∗(x1, . . . , xn) is unistructural in y. Now suppose z 6∈ {x1, . . . , xn}. Unless z = y, e1 and e2 agree on z and hence
so do e′1 and e′2, which is a contradiction. So, z = y. Also, since y 6∈ {x1, . . . , xn} and y occurs in F , condition (i)
of Definition 2.1 implies that the game P∗(x1, . . . , xn) does not depend on y and hence is y-unistructural. Claim 1 is
proven.
Combining (47) with Claim 1, we find that e′1 and e′2 only disagree on at most finitely many variables, and the game
P∗(x1, . . . , xn) is unistructural in every variable on which e′1 and e′2 disagree. With a little thought we can see that
then Lre
′
1[P∗(x1,...,xn)] = Lre′2[P∗(x1,...,xn)] which, by (49), implies Lre1[P∗(t1,...,tn)] = Lre2[P∗(t1,...,tn)]. This completes
our proof of (48) and hence of Fact 2.2.
Appendix B. Proof of Fact 3.8
Assume F is any hyperformula, ∗ is an F-admissible interpretation, and Ě is the perfect interpretation induced by
(∗, e). We want to show that then Ě is also F-admissible. Just as in the proof of Lemma 3.9, we may also assume
that F does not contain hybrid atoms, for otherwise replace F with its general dehybridization. Since Ě is a perfect
interpretation, it automatically satisfies clause (i) of Definition 2.1. To see that clause (ii) is also satisfied, pick any
n-ary letter L of F , interpreted as L∗(x1, . . . , xn) by ∗ and as LĚ(x1, . . . , xn) by Ě. It would suffice to show that
whenever L∗ is unistructural in xi (1 ≤ i ≤ n), so is LĚ. For simplicity, let us just consider the case i = 1.
Assume LĚ is not unistructural in x1, i.e. there are two valuations f and g that agree on all variables but x1 such that
Lr f [LĚ] 6= Lrg[LĚ]. Let a = f (x1), b = g(x1), c2 = f (x2) = g(x2), . . . , cn = f (xn) = g(xn). Then clearly f [LĚ] =
LĚ(a, c2, . . . , cn) and g[LĚ] = LĚ(b, c2, . . . , cn), so that LrLĚ(a,c2,...,cn) 6= LrLĚ(b,c2,...,cn). From here, taking into
account that Ě is the perfect interpretation induced by (∗, e) and hence LĚ(a, c2, . . . , cn) = e[L∗(a, c2, . . . , cn)] and
LĚ(b, c2, . . . , cn) = e[L∗(b, c2, . . . , cn)], we find Lre[L∗(a,c2,...,cn)] 6= Lre[L∗(b,c2,...,cn)]. The latter can be obviously
rewritten as LrL
∗
e1 6= LrL
∗
e2 , where e1 and e2 are the valuations with e1(x1) = a, e2(x1) = b, e1(x2) = e2(x2) = c2,
. . . , e1(xn) = e2(xn) = cn , and e1(y) = e2(y) = e(y) for every variable y 6∈ {x1, . . . , xn}. Since e1 and e2 agree on
all variables but x1, we find that L∗ is not x1-unistructural.
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